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TERRITORIAL EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE
AMERICAN WELFARE STATE
Andrew Hammond*
Federal law excludes millions of American citizens from crucial public bene-
fits simply because they live in the United States territories. If the Social Secu-
rity Administration determines a low-income individual has a disability,
that person can move to another state and continue to receive benefits. But if
that person moves to, say, Guam or the U.S. Virgin Islands, that person loses
their right to federal aid. Similarly with SNAP (food stamps), federal spend-
ing rises with increased demand—whether because of a recession, a pandem-
ic, or a climate disaster. But unlike the rest of the United States, Puerto Rico,
the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa receive a limited
amount of federal food assistance, regardless of need. That’s why, after Hur-
ricane Maria, despite additional congressional action, over a million Puerto
Rican residents lost food assistance. And with Medicaid, federal law caps
medical assistance for each of these five territories, a limit that does not exist
for the fifty states or the District of Columbia.
This Article draws much-needed attention to these discrepancies in legal sta-
tus and social protection. It surveys the eligibility rules and financing struc-
ture of disability benefits, food assistance, and health insurance for low-
income Americans in the states and the territories. A comprehensive account
of these practices provokes questions about the tiers of citizenship built by a
fragmented and devolved American state. Part I invokes the scholarship on
social citizenship, the idea that an individual cannot meaningfully partici-
pate in society without some modicum of economic security. Part I then ex-
plores the tension between that normative commitment and one of the
defining features of the American welfare state—federalism. It then elabo-
rates the exceptional legal status of Americans who live in U.S. territories.
Part II provides a comprehensive overview of federal food, medical, and disa-
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bility assistance and, in doing so, demonstrates how the American territories
inhabit a different and, in many ways, dilapidated corner of the American
welfare state. Part III begins with an analysis of ongoing cases in federal
court that challenge this facial discrimination. It then canvasses legislation
introduced in Congress that would make significant progress in putting terri-
torial Americans on par with Americans in the fifty states. To conclude, Part
IV brings the states back in, using the earlier discussion of territories as an
invitation to imagine an American welfare state built on a foundation other
than a racial order.
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INTRODUCTION
José Luis Vaello-Madero was born in Puerto Rico—a U.S. citizen by
birth.1 Thirty years later, he moved from Puerto Rico to New York. Nearly
thirty years after that, in 2012, Vaello-Madero began to receive federal disa-
bility benefits through the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. In
2013, Vaello-Madero moved back to Puerto Rico. A few years later, the So-
cial Security Administration informed him that it would discontinue his SSI
benefits, dated retroactively to his return to Puerto Rico. In its notice, the
agency stated that Vaello-Madero had been “outside of the U.S. for 30 days
in a row or more” since 2014.2 The agency noted that it “consider[ed] the
U.S. to be the 50 States of the U.S., the District of Columbia, and the North-
ern Mariana Islands.”3 Puerto Rico has been a United States territory for 122
years.4
Roughly a year later, the United States sued Vaello-Madero to recover
the allegedly improper disability benefits over that two-year period, for a to-
tal of $28,081.5 An investigator employed by the Social Security Administra-
tion got Vaello-Madero, who was without counsel at the time, to sign a
stipulated judgment, which the federal government promptly filed in federal
court in Puerto Rico.6 The district court appointed counsel for Vaello-
Madero who raised as an affirmative defense that excluding Vaello-Madero
and other Puerto Rican residents from SSI benefits violated the Constitu-
tion’s equal protection guarantee.7 On cross-motions for summary judg-
ment, the district judge agreed, and last April the First Circuit affirmed,
holding that excluding Puerto Rican residents from the SSI program violates
equal protection. The Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for
certiorari on March 1, 2021.8
Vaello-Madero’s exclusion from public benefits epitomizes the extent to
which federal law places millions of Americans outside the welfare state.
Federal law excludes these American citizens from crucial public benefits
simply because they live in the U.S. territories. For instance, Puerto Rico, the
1. See 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (“All persons born in Puerto Rico on or after January 13, 1941,
and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, are citizens of the United States at birth.”).
This narrative relies on the filings and judicial opinions in United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956
F.3d 12, 15–17 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 1462 (2021) (mem.).
2. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 15–16.
3. Id. at 16.
4. See Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of
Spain, Spain-U.S., Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
5. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 16.
6. Id. Congress established a federal court in Puerto Rico in 1900 and conferred Article
III status on the district court in 1966. Organic (Foraker) Act of 1900, ch. 191, § 34, 31 Stat. 77,
84–85 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 119); Act of Sept. 12, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-571, 80 Stat.
764.
7. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 16.
8. United States v. Vaello-Madero, 141 S. Ct. 1462 (2021) (mem.).
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Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), and American Samoa are excluded from
SNAP (food stamps). Instead, these three territories receive block grants for
food assistance, which do not respond to a surge in increased need.9 That’s
why, after Hurricane Maria decimated the island, Puerto Rico languished as
it waited to receive additional temporary aid from Congress.10 When it
comes to healthcare, federal law reimburses territories for their Medicaid
programs at significantly lower rates than it does for states.11 And as with
food assistance, the federal government caps medical assistance for each of
these territories, a limit that does not exist for the fifty states or the District
of Columbia.12 As Vaello-Madero’s case illustrates, no American living in
Puerto Rico can receive SSI benefits, regardless of age or disability.
These discrepancies surrounding public benefits mirror the exclusion of
territorial Americans in other areas of federal law. An American who lives
in, say, Florida who then moves to the British Virgin Islands can vote in
presidential elections via an absentee ballot.13 But if that same person moves
to the U.S. Virgin Islands, she cannot.14 To draw attention to its residents’
disenfranchisement, Guam held a presidential straw poll on Election Day.15
American Samoans possess an even stranger status. While those born in the
other four territories are recognized by the federal government as citizens by
birth, the State Department stamps American Samoans’ passports with the
following disclaimer: “The bearer [of this passport] is a United States nation-
al and not a United States citizen.”16 Last year, a federal judge disagreed, rul-
ing that a person born in American Samoa is a U.S. citizen within the
9. See infra Section II.B.2.
10. Brynne Keith-Jennings, Puerto Rico Forced to Slash Basic Food Aid While Waiting
for Washington to Act, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES: OFF THE CHARTS (Mar. 6, 2019,
2:30 PM), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/puerto-rico-forced-to-slash-basic-food-aid-while-
waiting-for-washington-to-act [https://perma.cc/KB3N-TC66].
11. Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202: Puerto Rico’s Problems Include a Med-
icaid Shortfall, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2017, 9:04 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/powerpost/paloma/the-health-202/2017/10/04/the-health-202-puerto-rico-s-problems-
include-a-medicaid-shortfall/59d3d96130fb0468cea81d2d [https://perma.cc/7XHK-PV63]; see
also infra Section II.A.2.
12. See infra Section II.A.2.
13. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301–20311.
14. See, e.g., Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 811 (3d Cir. 2007) (rejecting a
legal challenge to the disenfranchisement of Americans living in the U.S. Virgin Islands be-
cause it is “established that citizens choosing to reside within its borders are not entitled to vote
for electors even if they are denied a role in the selection of the President and Vice-President”).
15. See Mar-Vic Cagurangan, The US Election That Doesn’t Count: Guam Goes to the
Polls but Votes Won’t Matter, GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian
.com/world/2020/oct/31/the-us-election-that-doesnt-count-guam-goes-to-the-polls-but-votes-
wont-matter [https://perma.cc/D6KM-K7PH]; 3 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 7107, 11130 (2020),
http://www.guamcourts.org/compileroflaws/gca.html.
16. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 505.2 (2020) (cleaned up),
https:// fam.state.gov/fam/08fam/08fam050502.html [https://perma.cc/EDF7-4BDC].
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meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.17 The Tenth Circuit heard argu-
ment on the case last fall.18 Any inquiry into the public law that governs the
U.S. territories necessarily runs up against a persistent democratic deficit.
While some may dismiss these irregularities as mere fodder for academ-
ic debate, they ensnare over three million Americans. Five times as many
Americans live in the territories than in the District of Columbia. Roughly as
many Americans live in the territories19 as those in Alaska, Delaware, Ha-
waii, and Wyoming combined.20 While the federal government excludes
these Americans from the official poverty measurements for the country,
what data we have on poverty levels paints a stark picture.21 The Census Bu-
reau estimates that the poverty rate in Puerto Rico in 2018 was 43.5%, com-
pared to 11.8% in the fifty states and the District of Columbia.22 Adults living
in the U.S. Virgin Islands are two and a half times more likely to lack health
insurance than those in the fifty states.23
This level of poverty and deprivation will only worsen as the five U.S.
territories are particularly vulnerable to the ravages of the climate crisis.
Those who live there will face increasingly tenuous living conditions due to
extreme weather events made more frequent and more intense by a warming
17. Fitisemanu v. United States, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1155 (D. Utah 2019), argued, No. 20-
4019 (10th Cir. Sept. 23, 2020). There is an argument to exclude American Samoa from the
focus of this Article since its residents are typically considered “noncitizen nationals.” See 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22). While the people of American Samoa may have tougher sledding in fed-
eral court as a result, I have decided to include that territory in the analysis as their welfare
programs parallel those of the other four territories and much of the legislative activity on ter-
ritorial welfare administration lumps American Samoa together with the other four.
18. Oral Argument, Fitisemanu v. United States, No. 20-4019 (10th Cir. argued Sept. 23,
2020), https://www.courtlistener.com/audio/71814/fitisemanu-v-united-states; see also Press
Release, Aumua Amata, Rep., House of Representatives, Amata’s Statement on Filing of Ap-
peal (Apr. 14, 2020), https://radewagen.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/amata-s-
statement-filing-appeal [https://perma.cc/9UWD-4BPM].
19. JUSTYNA GOWOROWSKA & STEVEN WILSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RECENT
POPULATION TRENDS FOR THE U.S. ISLAND AREAS: 2000 TO 2010, at 15 (2015),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p23-213.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RL6L-NPJX] (populations for Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, the CNMI, and
American Samoa).
20. Calculation based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2019 population estimates. See State
Population Totals and Components of Change: 2010–2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-state-total.html [https://
perma.cc/XL9M-4DYZ]; GOWOROWSKA & WILSON, supra note 19, at 15.
21. See Francine J. Lipman, (Anti)Poverty Measures Exposed, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 389,
404–05 (2017) (pointing out that residents of the five territories “are excluded from the starting
population used [by the Census Bureau] to measure poverty [in the United States]”).
22. Compare Quick Facts: Puerto Rico, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov
/quickfacts/PR [https://perma.cc/VN9A-RFBF], with JESSICA SEMEGA, MELISSA KOLLAR, JOHN
CREAMER & ABINASH MOHANTY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2018 (2020), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library
/publications/2019/demo/p60-266.pdf [https://perma.cc/UJ7Q-XA7W].
23. U.S. Virgin Islands: Fast Facts, KFF (Dec. 13, 2017), https://files.kff.org/attachment/
Fact-Sheet-US-Virgin-Islands-Fast-Facts [https://perma.cc/FEH4-C88B].
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planet.24 In 2018, American Samoa suffered through Cyclone Gita25 and the
CNMI withstood Typhoon Yutu—the most powerful storm to hit the United
States since 1935.26 Two Category 5 hurricanes struck the U.S. Virgin Islands
within a two-week period in 2017.27 One of them, Hurricane Maria, also dec-
imated Puerto Rico.28 Precisely when territories need additional resources to
recover from the rolling disaster that is climate change, federal law fails them.
This Article lays bare the ways in which federal law denies certain Amer-
icans protection from hunger, sickness, and disability because they live in the
country’s territories. The Article explores the ways in which federal law dis-
advantages Americans who live in the territories by impeding their access to
basic disability, food, and medical assistance.29 There is a rich scholarly con-
versation on the exceptional status of the U.S. territories, much of it criti-
cal.30 But this literature does not focus on social protection, and it does not
cover the distinct domains of disability law, food assistance, and health care.
24. Sarah Kaplan, The Undeniable Link Between Weather Disasters and Climate Change,
WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2020, 11:46 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-
solutions/2020/10/22/climate-curious-disasters-climate-change [https://perma.cc/GS2E-
DYT5].
25. Samoa Swept by Cyclone Gita, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 11, 2018), https://www.aljazeera
.com/news/2018/2/11/samoa-swept-by-cyclone-gita [https://perma.cc/43XS-N7PT].
26. Chris Mooney, Juliet Eilperin & Allyson Chiu, Category 5 Typhoon Yutu Devastates
the Northern Marianas in Worst Storm to Hit Any Part of U.S. Since 1935, WASH. POST (Oct.
25, 2018, 5:23 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/10/25
/category-typhoon-devastates-northern-marianas-worst-storm-hit-us-since [https://perma.cc
/RT72-DCQ3].
27. See Jeremy W. Peters, In the Virgin Islands, Hurricane Maria Drowned What Irma
Didn’t Destroy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017), https://nytimes.com/2017/09/27/us/hurricane-
maria-virgin-islands.html [https://perma.cc/KE8N-HAXW]; Greg Allen, After 2 Hurricanes, a
‘Floodgate’ of Mental Health Issues in U.S. Virgin Islands, NPR (Apr. 23, 2019, 3:00 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/23/716089187/after-two-hurricanes-a-floodgate-of-mental-
health-issues-in-the-virgin-islands [https://perma.cc/9SPL-YA38].
28. Robinson Meyer, What’s Happening with the Relief Effort in Puerto Rico? A Timeline
of the Unprecedented Catastrophe of Hurricane Maria, ATLANTIC (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www
.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/10/what-happened-in-puerto-rico-a-timeline-of-
hurricane-maria/541956 [https://perma.cc/LT4M-KX82].
29. See H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 115TH CONG., GREEN BOOK, app. A (2018)
[hereinafter GREEN BOOK], https://greenbook-waysandmeans.house.gov/2018-green-
book/appendix-a-social-welfare-programs-in-the-territories [https://perma.cc/6HKJ-XMDM]
(“Some [social welfare] programs are only available in certain territories and for some pro-
grams the territories receive funding based on different formulas or under different circum-
stances than do the states.”).
30. See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Robert D. Sloane, The Constitutionality of Decolonization
by Associated Statehood: Puerto Rico’s Legal Status Reconsidered, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1142–44
(2009); Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexa-
tion, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797 (2005); Pedro A. Malavet, Puerto Rico: Cultural Nation, American
Colony, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2000) (describing how Puerto Ricans are an identifiable culture
that lacks a legal citizenship, and how they are deprived of real political power because of their
second-class U.S. citizenship); José Julián Alvarez González, The Empire Strikes Out: Congres-
sional Ruminations on the Citizenship Status of Puerto Ricans, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 309
(1990).
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Moreover, this Article adds to the literature by seizing on two recent devel-
opments: significant congressional activity over the last several years and lit-
igation winding through the federal courts right now. The groundswell of
demands for racial justice and the outcome of the 2020 election may create
an opportunity for significant progress in this neglected corner of federal law.
Two caveats are in order. First, this Article risks eliding the different his-
tories, politics, and social dynamics of these five territories. Today, each of
these territories have different constituencies, interests, and agendas when it
comes to the federal government. These differences make it challenging to
capture their respective subordination in our current constitutional order.
But by providing a comprehensive comparative analysis of how federal law
treats these five territories in the specific field of welfare provision, this Arti-
cle shows that their treatment compared to states, or even among them-
selves, is difficult to justify.
Second, bear in mind that those who reside in these territories do not
necessarily think American citizenship is an unalloyed good. Indeed, in this
context and others, it has often been perceived as a weapon that the federal
government can wield to stifle sovereignty and promote assimilation.31 And
the territories themselves are sites of migration, and not just to and from the
United States.32 Indeed, many in the territories insist on some kind of inde-
pendence from the United States.33 However, this Article does not question
whether the territories should have a different legal relationship to the Unit-
ed States, whether it be statehood, independence or something else. Rather,
this Article begins with the fact that most who live in the territories today are
American citizens and proceeds to focus on what the social dimensions of
these Americans’ citizenship should be.
Social citizenship is defined as the extent to which an individual’s mem-
bership in a polity includes protection from the social and economic vulner-
ability that accompanies the common crises of modern life, such as
unemployment, sickness, and old age.34 Thus, the purpose of this project is
more modest than some of the more wide-ranging scholarship on the U.S.
territories. It is grounded in the reality that American public law attempts to
protect people from these inevitable misfortunes. Yet the legacies of a racial-
ized welfare state and its architecture of states’ rights has undermined the
31. See, e.g., Brief for Intervenors or, in the Alt., Amici Curiae the Am. Samoa Gov’t &
Congressman Eni F.H. Faleomavaega at 23–35, Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (No. 13-5272) (opposing constitutional birthright citizenship); Valeria M. Pelet del Toro,
Note, Beyond the Critique of Rights: The Puerto Rico Legal Project and Civil Rights Litigation in
America’s Colony, 128 YALE L.J. 792 (2019) (“Any articulation of rights, the privileges that
come with U.S. citizenship, or even the meaning of the nation’s relationship with the United
States, is inherently political in Puerto Rico.”).
32. See Elizabeth Corpus, Migrants Rebuild Their Lives in Puerto Rico Despite Challeng-
es, USC ANNENBERG MEDIA (Sept. 30, 2019), http://www.uscannenbergmedia.com/2019/09/30
/migrants-rebuild-their-lives-in-puerto-rico-despite-challenges [https://perma.cc/VFS4-938V].
33. See, e.g., Pelet del Toro, supra note 31, at 813–19.
34. See infra Section I.A.
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possibility of a legal commitment to a social minimum. This status quo,
whether it was ever justified, is ill-suited to the demands of American society
today, and Americans who live in U.S. territories are particularly ill-served
by the status quo.
Legislators, judges, and scholars routinely look past who is left outside a
welfare state premised on cooperative federalism. This Article foregrounds
legal regimes that challenge this bias. The Article uses the term “outside” be-
cause territorial residents, though American citizens, are often placed outside
of both the doctrines and the deliberations that govern the American state.35
They do not have a vote in Congress nor can they vote for President, and they
do not have recourse to challenge the lawmaking of either of the political
branches in federal court in the ways that other discrete and insular minori-
ties may. But in another sense, the title is as prescriptive as the project. We
can no longer afford a legal regime that condemns citizens to their fates in
states. We have a thin conception of American citizenship indeed if the
rights to food and health—to survival itself—depend on which state Ameri-
cans happen to reside in. By focusing on American citizens who happen to live
outside of states, this Article builds the case for a level of social protection that
is not held hostage by the vicissitudes of state politics. Following some of the
most sustained protests against racial injustice in decades and a bitterly divi-
sive presidential election, this Article makes the case that a broad-based jus-
tice movement could—and should—shake the foundation of the racialized
welfare state, including its exclusion of Americans in the territories.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces the normative frame-
work of social citizenship and applies it to the American welfare state and
one of its defining features—federalism. It then elaborates the exceptional
status of Americans who live in U.S. territories. Part II provides an overview
of food, medical, and disability assistance in the five territories and demon-
strates how the American territories inhabit a different and in many ways
dilapidated corner of the American welfare state. Part III analyzes two cases
in the federal courts that challenge the status quo and then proceeds to can-
vass proposed legislation that would make significant progress in putting
territorial Americans on par with Americans in the fifty states. In Part IV,
the Article brings the states back in, using the emphasis on territories as an
invitation to others to build the American welfare state on a foundation oth-
er than a racial order.
35. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 4 (2014) (using “out-
side” to describe both the exclusion of individuals or groups and the lawlessness of American
public law); Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Narratives of Identity, Nation, and Outsiders
Within Outsiders: Not Yet a Post-anything World, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 325, 333–34
(2011); Pedro A. Malavet, Afterword, Outsider Citizenships and Multidimensional Borders: The
Power and Danger of Not Belonging, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 321, 322 (2005) (discussing “the pow-
er of deconstructing entrenched power normativities from an outsider perspective, hence, the
power of not belonging”).
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I. SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP OUTSIDE THE STATES
This Part situates Americans who live in U.S. territories in both the in-
tellectual framework of social citizenship and the doctrine of the American
constitutional system. It then connects those two contexts to the specific
problem of how government furnishes basic services for marginalized citi-
zens. Territorial residents are American citizens who benefit from a different
and, in most respects, dilapidated welfare state compared to the rest of the
country. This project pins down those differences. But to show how those
differences raise some normative hackles, let alone why one might challenge
them in the courts or Congress, the Article needs a theoretical baseline. That
baseline is the concept of social citizenship.
A. Why Social Citizenship?
This Article relies on the concept of social citizenship to organize its
analysis of how the American welfare state treats some Americans differently
by virtue of their territorial residency. To get to a workable definition of so-
cial citizenship, one must contend with its intellectual origins in the social
sciences and the legal academy.
Social scientists are indebted to the British sociologist T.H. Marshall for
the idea of social citizenship. In a series of lectures shortly after World War
II,36 Marshall began using the term to identify rights to economic security
and healthcare and distinguish them from the more traditional categories of
rights that, at the time, dominated political theory.37 According to Marshall,
typical rights talk relies on a binary of political rights, such as the right to
vote, and civil rights, such as the right to religious expression.38 Importantly,
these rights derive from membership in a polity.39 By enumerating a third
category or dimension of citizenship, Marshall’s concept of social citizenship
became the intellectual counterpart to the societal reality of the British gov-
36. T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS, AND OTHER ESSAYS 10–11 (1950)
(arguing that the rights of social citizenship “range from the right to a modicum of economic
welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a
civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society”); see also CITIZENSHIP
TODAY: THE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF T.H. MARSHALL (Martin Bulmer & Anthony M.
Rees eds., Routledge 2016) (1996); Desmond S. King & Jeremy Waldron, Citizenship, Social
Citizenship and the Defence of Welfare Provision, 18 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 415, 418–22 (1988).
37. See MARSHALL, supra note 36, at 48–65 (discussing legal aid, housing, education,
and income security as components of social citizenship); see also Keith G. Banting, Social Citi-
zenship and Federalism: Is a Federal Welfare State a Contradiction in Terms?, in TERRITORY,
DEMOCRACY, AND JUSTICE: REGIONALISM AND FEDERALISM IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 44, 45
(Scott L. Greer ed., 2006) (describing the concept of social citizenship as “most clearly articu-
lated by the British sociologist T.H. Marshall”).
38. See MARSHALL, supra note 36, at 14; see also Mark Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social
Rights: The Future of the Reconstruction Amendments, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1207, 1210 (1992)
(drawing this distinction).
39. MARSHALL, supra note 36, at 11.
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ernment playing a larger role in protecting and regulating its citizens’ lives.40
Consequently, while some anticipated this social dimension of citizenship
long before T.H. Marshall,41 its prominence dates only to the last century.
Social citizenship theorizes that members of a society have something—
whether it be a status, a basket of goods, or rights—that empowers them to
confront a range of risks: the loss of a job, the loss of a caretaker, the need to
become a caretaker, illness, old age, and death.42 These social risks strain an
individual’s ability to live and carry consequences for that individual’s fami-
ly, community, and the larger society.43
For legal academics, social citizenship has a distinctively American
provenance. Legal historian William Forbath has shown how both the Popu-
lists and Progressives of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as
well as the New Deal coalition offered a constitutional vision of social citi-
zenship.44 For these Americans, Forbath argues that the social citizenship
tradition was “[a]imed against harsh class inequalities” and “centered on de-
cent work and livelihoods, social provision, and a measure of economic in-
dependence and democracy.”45 For Forbath and others, labor and paid work
are central to social citizenship, but social provision, including through the
40. See Michael Ignatieff, The Myth of Citizenship, 12 QUEEN’S L.J. 399, 411 (1987) (ar-
guing that T.H. Marshall’s definition of social citizenship updates the “purely formal” notions
of civil and political citizenship); see also GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF
WELFARE CAPITALISM 21 (1990) (“Social citizenship constitutes the core idea of a welfare state.”);
Margaret R. Somers, Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere: Law, Community, and Po-
litical Culture in the Transition to Democracy, 58 AM. SOCIO. REV. 587, 590 (1993) (“Marshall’s
core conceptions remain the touchstone for much recent scholarly work on citizenship.”).
41. See, e.g., THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1791–1792), reprinted in THE
THOMAS PAINE READER 201, 336–37 (Michael Foot & Isaac Kramnick eds., 1987); see also
Adrian Little, The Politics of Compensation: Tom Paine’s Agrarian Justice and Liberal Egalitari-
anism, 5 CONTEMP. POL. 63 (1999).
42. See Banting, supra note 37, at 44 (“The promise of social citizenship is the equality of
treatment of citizens, to be achieved through common social benefits and public services avail-
able to all citizens throughout a country.”).
43. Marshall and others saw this concept as reinforcing civil and political rights. See
MARSHALL, supra note 36, at 75–85; see also RUTH LISTER, CITIZENSHIP: FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES 16–17 (2d ed. 2003) (describing social rights as citizenship rights because “they
help to promote the effective exercise of civil and political rights by groups who are disadvan-
taged in terms of power and resources”).
44. William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Recon-
struction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821 (2001). This is not to say that this literature is disconnect-
ed from political theory. See William E. Forbath, Not So Simple Justice: Frank Michelman on
Social Rights, 1969–Present, 39 TULSA L. REV. 597, 621 (2004) (“Rawls’s precepts for political
economy fall squarely within the social citizenship tradition[]. . . [and] bear[] a strong family
resemblance to those of the Populists, Progressives, and New Dealers who fashioned the vari-
ants of social citizenship thought in America.”).
45. William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1
(1999); see also Nancy E. Dowd, Children’s Equality Rights: Every Child’s Right to Develop to
Their Full Capacity, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367, 1396 (2020) (characterizing the concept of so-
cial citizenship as “a theory of positive rights grounded in Reconstruction and the New Deal”).
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Social Security Act, is also a vital manifestation of the tradition.46 Important-
ly, Forbath and other legal scholars attend to the institutional implications of
social citizenship. Forbath has explained how, for the Populists, Progressives,
and New Deal Democrats, social citizenship is “a majoritarian tradition, ad-
dressing its arguments to lawmakers and citizens, not to courts.”47
For both social scientists and legal scholars, then, social citizenship is a
serviceable framework because it creates a readily identifiable set of benefits
for members of a polity.48 While an inquiry into the lacking social dimen-
sions of political membership could simply be framed as second-class citi-
zenship, that framing still leaves the following question unanswered: how
does that inferior status manifest itself in social provision? Instead, social cit-
izenship begins with that question. It also trains the eye to see individuals
and institutions.49 Thus, it is a concept that foregrounds the state in the
scholarly conversation of individual rights while, in the words of legal histo-
rian Bill Novak, “deal[ing] directly with what has become a preeminent so-
46. Forbath, supra note 45, at 12 (“[T]he social meaning of equal citizenship must in-
clude the opportunity to earn a livelihood that enables one to contribute to supporting oneself
and one’s family in a minimally decent fashion.”); Vicki Schultz, Essay, Life’s Work, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1938 (2000) (“Paid work has the potential to become the universal plat-
form for equal citizenship . . . .”); cf. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Essay, Stimulus and Civil Rights,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 154, 166 (2011) (“[T]he material commitments manifested in federal
spending programs function to establish a set of baseline protections that can be constitutive of
citizenship.”).
47. Forbath, supra note 45, at 1; see also Goodwin Liu, Interstate Inequality in Educa-
tional Opportunity, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2044, 2048 (2006) (“[T]he social citizenship tradition
contemplates the development of constitutional meaning through legislation and the political
process, not merely through adjudication.”); William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in
Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 197 (2001) (“[T]o generations of populists and progres-
sives . . . ,courts . . . could not and should not translate the general rights-declaring provisions
of the Reconstruction Amendments into specific guarantees of social and economic rights in
industrial America.”).
48. For a helpful synthesis of the social science literature and legal scholarship on social
citizenship, see Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neolib-
eral Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 785 (2003). See also Joanna L. Grossman,
Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J. 567, 589 (2010) (connect-
ing Marshall’s and Forbath’s scholarship on social citizenship); Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Len-
hardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1161, 1196 (2008) (supporting social
citizenship as a framework but critiquing it “for its exclusive focus on the formal citizen, re-
flecting an inattention to immigration and the global dimension of work in today’s economy”).
49. See William J. Novak, The Legal Transformation of Citizenship in Nineteenth-
Century America, in THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL HISTORY 85, 85 (Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2003) (“Cit-
izenship directs attention precisely to that point where bottom-up constructions of rights con-
sciousness and political participation meet the top-down policies and formal laws of
legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies.”); see also SAM ERMAN, ALMOST CITIZENS:
PUERTO RICO, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND EMPIRE 4 (2019) (arguing for the use of citizen-
ship in this area of scholarship because conceptually it “occupies a powerful middle ground
between officialdom and the populace”).
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cial and political question in our time—inclusion and exclusion based on
identity.”50
One conceptual weakness of social citizenship is that some scholars have
previously suggested it as the third step in a linear development of ever-
expanding rights.51 But while Marshall and others may have suggested such a
progression, there is nothing intrinsic in the concept that requires such an
evolutionary outlook. A society can privilege social dimensions of citizenship
over civil dimensions. For instance, for decades France has been particularly
willing to honor social protections while denying protections for religious
expression.52 And Forbath, Dorothy Roberts, and others have suggested that
“the absence of political citizenship led to the defeat of social citizenship in
America.”53 Nor should we expect stability in any particular dimension of
citizenship over time. Indeed, recent studies of welfare provision in several
wealthy democracies suggests that as the citizenry has expanded, welfare re-
sources have not.54 Some scholars account for this development by citing a
lack of political power in the new members of the polity and others argue it
is “due to a rigidification of moral boundaries based on perceptions of de-
servingness.”55
Another challenge is to demarcate the rights and protections that ac-
company social citizenship. One way to do so is to identify the risks—such as
50. Novak, supra note 49, at 85; see JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE
QUEST FOR INCLUSION (1991).
51. Novak, supra note 49, at 93 (criticizing T.H. Marshall’s theory as a “teleological story
of unfolding rights of ever higher forms of citizenship”).
52. See RODNEY BENSON, SHAPING IMMIGRATION NEWS: A FRENCH-AMERICAN
COMPARISON (2013); Shaira Nanwani, Comment, The Burqa Ban: An Unreasonable Limitation
on Religious Freedom or a Justifiable Restriction?, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1431 (2011); see also
MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE
344 (Univ. of Pa. Press updated ed. 2008) (“Marshall stressed the conflict between civil and
social citizenship at the heart of the welfare state.”).
53. Forbath, supra note 47, at 209 (“Not only were most black Americans excluded from
the benefits of the main New Deal programs, but this constitutional bad faith at black Ameri-
ca’s expense also deprived all Americans of the institutional foundations and political-
constitutional legacy of social citizenship.”); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Prob-
lem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563, 1589 (1996) (book review) (“Faith in universal-
ism . . . underestimates America’s problem with Black citizenship.”); Elizabeth M. Iglesias,
Foreword, Identity, Democracy, Communicative Power, Inter/National Labor Rights and the
Evolution of LatCrit Theory and Community, 53 U. MIA. L. REV. 575, 593 (1999).
54. See Irene Bloemraad, Will Kymlicka, Michèle Lamon & Leanne S. Son Hing, Mem-
bership Without Social Citizenship? Deservingness and Redistribution as Grounds for Equality,
DAEDALUS, Summer 2019, at 73, 78.
55. Id. at 74. Compare Maria Abascal & Delia Baldassarri, Love Thy Neighbor? Ethnora-
cial Diversity and Trust Reexamined, 121 AM. J. SOCIO. 722, 756 (2015) (suggesting that dimin-
ished social capital decreases trust levels and makes it more difficult to develop policies that
reflect the interests of all members), with Wim van Oorschot, Making the Difference in Social
Europe: Deservingness Perceptions Among Citizens of European Welfare States, 16 J. EUR. SOC.
POL’Y 23 (2006) (examining whether particular demographics tend to differentiate between the
deservingness of groups for welfare more strictly than others).
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unemployment, sickness, disability, and old age—social citizenship protects
against.56 Some activists, scholars, and policymakers have also worked to ex-
plain how caring for others, whether they are children, sick family members,
or ageing loved ones, should also be included in this set of risks.57 Another
way to conceptualize this dimension of citizenship is to identify basic human
needs like food, medical care, and housing. Each of these risks and needs can
be contested in the academy and the political arena.
It is important to keep these caveats in mind when relying on social citi-
zenship as an organizing concept,58 but social citizenship’s malleability
makes it well suited to this turbulent moment in American public law. This
inegalitarian age—awash in a potent politics of racism, nativism, and fear—
cries out for a coherent vision of justice and human dignity. Activists and
academics alike increasingly find liberalism wanting.59 Many question
whether liberalism’s reliance on formal rules and rights creates a mere ve-
neer of political and civil equality.60 Some are groping toward a new empha-
sis on collective action, power, and political economy.61 This Article does not
wait for this din of discourse to harmonize. Regardless of what this new poli-
56. See, e.g., Giuliano Bonoli, The Politics of the New Social Policies: Providing Coverage
Against New Social Risks in Mature Welfare States, 33 POL’Y & POL. 431, 444 (2005).
57. E.g., Ann Shola Orloff, Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative
Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States, 58 AM. SOCIO. REV. 303, 313 (1993).
58. Perhaps scholars could rely on the concept of human flourishing, vulnerability theo-
ry, or earlier work on antisubordination. For an articulation of human flourishing, see THE
QUALITY OF LIFE (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993), and in the context of poor
families in the United States, see CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW
UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (2014), and Wendy A. Bach, Flourishing Rights, 113
MICH. L. REV. 1061, 1070–73 (2015) (reviewing HUNTINGTON, supra). See also Robin West,
Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1921 (2001). For vulner-
ability theory, see, for example, Martha Albertson Fineman, Injury in the Unresponsive State:
Writing the Vulnerable Subject into Neo-liberal Legal Culture, in INJURY AND INJUSTICE: THE
CULTURAL POLITICS OF HARM AND REDRESS 50 (Anne Bloom, David M. Engel & Michael
McCann eds., 2018). While attractive in several respects, these alternatives include more than
the stakes of social citizenship. Both encompass a panoply of rights and practices far beyond
social provision. This project has a narrower focus than the wide-ranging inquiry in human
flourishing or how public power oppresses its citizenry. Rather, this Article is trying to demon-
strate how American public law provides different protections for some American citizens
from the risks inherent in modern life.
59. See Kate Andrias & Benjamin I. Sachs, Constructing Countervailing Power: Law and
Organizing in an Era of Political Inequality, 130 YALE L.J. 546 (2021); David Singh Grewal &
Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4,
2014, at 1, 19–23; Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-oligarchy Constitution, 94
B.U. L. REV. 669, 671–73 (2014).
60. See STEVEN KLEIN, THE WORK OF POLITICS: MAKING A DEMOCRATIC WELFARE
STATE 22 (2020).
61. See Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K. Sabeel
Rahman, Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century
Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784 (2020); K. Sabeel Rahman, Essay, Constructing Citizenship: Exclu-
sion and Inclusion Through the Governance of Basic Necessities, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2447
(2018).
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tics (and political thought) of equality looks like, it will most likely include
some social dimension of basic needs. Thus, while the concept of social citi-
zenship was shaped by the liberal tradition in political theory, it also can be
used by those working to forge a new discourse on building mass power
against oligarchic forces in our politics, economy, and society. Whether the
ascendant theoretical paradigm is grounded in rights, power, or some other
framework, that discourse cannot overlook the individual’s ability to secure
basic necessities or the state’s obligations to protect its people from hunger
and sickness.62 By gathering up these types of basic assistance, social citizen-
ship provides an analytical lens to evaluate how government responds to
these particular needs of its citizens.
B. Social Citizenship and American Federalism
Now that we have some notion of social citizenship, including its limita-
tions and its potential, we can apply it to the more specific history of the
American welfare state, and in particular to one of its defining features: fed-
eralism. Social scientists often characterize the American welfare state as “re-
sidual” and less robust than other wealthy democracies.63 The residual
character of the American welfare state is often explained by a variety of fac-
tors: the lack of a traditional labor party in national politics, the relatively
unsuccessful socialist movement in the twentieth century, the persistence of
laissez-faire ideology and interests, and racial and gender hierarchies.64 An-
other mainstay of this discussion is the extent to which federalism in the
United States undermined national commitments to social provision.65
At first glance, the concept of social citizenship appears to be in tension
with federalism. Federalism implies some variation in governance, benefits,
and services across subnational units, whereas social citizenship is defined as
a basket of rights by virtue of national membership. If social citizenship can-
not overcome state boundaries, then it ceases to be the kind of status T.H.
Marshall and others envisioned. Of course, it is possible that some federal-
ism arrangements could accommodate a robust understanding of social citi-
zenship. All states could provide health insurance to all citizens but could do
so under different schemes of universal coverage, and over time, states could
62. See KLEIN, supra note 60, at 5 (“[M]any of the most significant democratic social
movements of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries have mobilized around welfare insti-
tutions.”).
63. See RICHARD M. TITMUSS, SOCIAL POLICY 30–32 (Brian Abel-Smith & Kay Titmuss
eds., Pantheon 1974) (explaining the residual welfare state model); see also ESPING-ANDERSEN,
supra note 40, at 20, 31, 49 (building on Titmuss’s typology and characterizing the United
States as a “liberal” welfare state).
64. See, e.g., Nathan Glazer, The American Welfare State: Exceptional No Longer?, in
CHALLENGES TO THE WELFARE STATE: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DYNAMICS FOR CHANGE 7
(Henry Cavanna ed., 1998). For the classic formulation of the power resources theory, see WALTER
KORPI, THE DEMOCRATIC CLASS STRUGGLE (1983). See also SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & GARY
MARKS, IT DIDN’T HAPPEN HERE: WHY SOCIALISM FAILED IN THE UNITED STATES (2000).
65. See Glazer, supra note 64, at 10.
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conceivably experiment with policies and programs that become models for
national initiatives.66 At a conceptual level, then, federalism and social citi-
zenship could work in concert.
As a matter of American governance, though, the relationship between
state autonomy and national substantive rights, including but not limited to
social rights, is fraught. First, federalism hampered any national commit-
ments to substantive rights until the Civil War.67 As Bill Novak has ex-
plained, federalism, as “the dominant feature of early American
governance . . . wreaked havoc on the substantive articulation of a coherent
conception of national citizenship rights.”68 But as Novak and others admit,
the Fourteenth Amendment “remade the American state.”69 Since then, “most
of American public law after the Civil War came to be rewritten in terms of the
rights of citizens of the national government and the federal powers that
would guarantee those rights.”70 Most of the controversies that shape public
law in the United States are struggles over Reconstruction’s ramifications.
After Reconstruction, federal–state relations continued to define Ameri-
can social provision. Political scientists accept that “[b]y separating national
and local authority, American federalism allowed local communities to over-
ride national majorities on basic matters of citizenship, even (and especially)
in parts of the South where blacks were a majority.”71 Indeed, in order to get
the New Deal through Congress, the Roosevelt Administration had to make
significant concessions to Southern legislators who insisted on placing Black
Americans outside of welfare schemes like Social Security.72 The racial ori-
gins of the New Deal—and its role in this first major expansion of the Amer-
66. See, e.g., Daniel Béland & André Lecours, Nationalism and Social Policy in Canada
and Québec, in THE TERRITORIAL POLITICS OF WELFARE 189 (Nicola McEwen & Luis Moreno
eds., 2005).
67. See Novak, supra note 49, at 92 (“Whereas modern citizenship involves a single,
formal, and undifferentiated legal status—membership in a central nation-state—that confers
universal and internal transjurisdictional rights upon its holders, nineteenth-century American
governance was precisely about differentiation, jurisdictional autonomy, and local control.”);
see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 33 (1975) (“[T]he concept of citi-
zenship play[ed] only the most minimal role in the American constitutional scheme.”). This
was especially true for people with few resources. See KRISTIN O’BRASSILL-KULFAN, VAGRANTS
AND VAGABONDS: POVERTY AND MOBILITY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 13–35 (2019).
68. Novak, supra note 49, at 92.
69. Id. at 109–10; see JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 224 (1951).
70. Novak, supra note 49, at 112.
71. Robert C. Lieberman & John S. Lapinski, American Federalism, Race and the Ad-
ministration of Welfare, 31 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 303, 303 (2001).
72. See Ira Katznelson, Kim Geiger & Daniel Kryder, Limiting Liberalism: The Southern
Veto in Congress, 1933–1950, 108 POL. SCI. Q. 283, 297 (1993); DAVID A. BATEMAN, IRA
KATZNELSON & JOHN S. LAPINSKI, SOUTHERN NATION: CONGRESS AND WHITE SUPREMACY
AFTER RECONSTRUCTION 7–8 (2018); CYBELLE FOX, THREE WORLDS OF RELIEF: RACE,
IMMIGRATION, AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO THE NEW
DEAL (2012).
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ican welfare state—remind us that welfare governance in the United States is
simultaneously a site of both inclusion and domination.73
The second major expansion of the American welfare state—President
Johnson’s War on Poverty and the Great Society—also had to negotiate how
to expand government services against the backdrop of federalism.74 The
Johnson Administration, in some ways, circumvented the states. Both the
national initiatives for community action and legal services used grants that
bypassed state and local government and went directly to nonprofit organi-
zations.75 The Medicare and Medicaid Act of 1965 also showed the tensions
of social citizenship and federalism. Medicare, like Social Security, was
placed beyond the vagaries of state governance. Health insurance for the el-
derly would be financed and administered by the federal government. Medi-
caid, on the other hand, was designed to be partially funded and mostly
administered by states.76
The major retrenchment efforts of the 1980s and 1990s used devolution
to make cuts to the American welfare state. Both the Reagan and Bush Ad-
ministrations sought to grant broad waivers giving state governments the
discretion to experiment with their welfare programs.77 But almost all of that
discretion led to governors and state legislatures cutting assistance and pun-
ishing recipients.78 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, which will be
discussed below as it relates to Puerto Rico, codified other cuts.79 When Presi-
dent Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
onciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), elected officials in both parties presented
this retrenchment as giving more authority and discretion to the states.80
Even the last major expansion of the American welfare state, the Afford-
able Care Act, can be understood as a conflict over the proper roles of the
federal government, state governments, and markets in providing
73. KLEIN, supra note 60, at 21, 28.
74. See ALICE O’CONNOR, POVERTY KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY,
AND THE POOR IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY U.S. HISTORY (2001).
75. Roger H. Davidson, The War on Poverty: Experiment in Federalism, ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Sept. 1969, at 1, 1.
76. See Banting, supra note 37, at 50–51 (pointing out that “[t]he United States is alone
in not having a separate equalization program” that attends to inequities of health care deliv-
ered by subnational, i.e., state, governments).
77. See Michael Wiseman, Welfare Reform in the United States: A Background Paper, 7
HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 595, 617–18 (1996).
78. See Lucy A. Williams, Essay, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare
Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 726 (1992); Timothy J. Casey, The Family Support Act of
1988: Molehill or Mountain, Retreat or Reform?, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 930, 931 (1989) (de-
scribing the aim of the legislation as “to reduce sharply the number of families receiving” cash
assistance).
79. See Wiseman, supra note 77, at 613–14.
80. Andrew Hammond, Welfare and Federalism’s Peril, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1721, 1729–
41 (2017) (discussing PRWORA’s devolutionary measures). Even in the 1990s, scholarly
treatments “still locate[d] the core problems of racial inequality in questions of federalism.”
Lieberman & Lapinski, supra note 71, at 303–04.
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healthcare.81 The national and categorical expansion of Medicaid would have
allowed all low-income Americans to receive health care regardless of state
residency.82 Once the Supreme Court gutted that provision,83 each state had
to decide whether to opt-in to the most significant expansion of government
assistance to poor Americans since 1965. A similar process unfolded with the
marketplace exchanges. The Act allowed each state to set up (or let the fed-
eral government set up) an exchange in which individuals who were not oth-
erwise covered could purchase subsidized health insurance. Here, too, the
Supreme Court, stepping in to protect states from what it perceived to be a
too-coercive federal government, undermined this provision.84
Federal action to expand or diminish the American welfare state does
not necessarily preclude states from taking action. Yet it is hard to identify
an example of sustained commitment by a state or several states to some so-
cial right over the last half century other than to public education.85 The
strongest example is probably the expansion of pre-K at the state level, which
is perhaps best seen as the educational exceptionalism of state action rather
than as a strictly antipoverty initiative.86 Yet even in that area, only nine
states have enrolled a majority of their children in pre-K, and only Vermont
and the District of Columbia have enrolled a majority of their three-year-
olds in early childhood education.87 This absence of state leadership in forg-
ing some modicum of social citizenship for their residents is not surprising
given the fiscal constraints under which states must operate.88 Putting aside
whether several states trying to finance and administer universal pre-K rises
to the level of some social minimum, it is a reminder to enumerate what ser-
vices comprise social citizenship.89
81. See Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, 70
STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2018); Beatrix Hoffman, Social Citizenship in the U.S. Affordable Care Act,
in DEMOCRACY AND THE WELFARE STATE: THE TWO WESTS IN THE AGE OF AUSTERITY 148
(Alice Kessler-Harris & Maurizio Vaudagna eds., 2018).
82. For an overview of relevant provisions of the Affordable Care Act, see Gluck & Hu-
berfeld, supra note 81, at 1727–36.
83. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 585 (2012) (plurality opinion)
(holding that Congress cannot “penalize States that choose not to participate in [the Affordable
Care Act] by taking away their existing Medicaid funding”).
84. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015) (holding that the federal government could
establish exchanges in states that chose not to do so by interpreting “state exchanges” to in-
clude “federal exchanges”).
85. See JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE 181 (2018); Barry Friedman & Sara
Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92 (2013); Good-
win Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203, 240–45 (2008).
86. See DAVID L. KIRP, THE SANDBOX INVESTMENT (2007).
87. ALLISON H. FRIEDMAN-KRAUSS, W. STEVEN BARNETT, KARIN A. GARVER,
KATHERINE S. HODGES, G.G. WEISENFELD & BETH ANN GARDINER, NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY
EDUC. RSCH., THE STATE OF PRESCHOOL 2019, at 26 tbl.2 (2020).
88. Hammond, supra note 80, at 1744–45 (discussing state budgetary rules).
89. See Lieberman & Lapinski, supra note 71, at 305 (“[T]he central question of Ameri-
can federalism is not the general matter of where governmental functions are located but the
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In light of this unsettled relationship between federalism and social citi-
zenship, one cannot ignore the persistent question of what social rights
American citizens enjoy outside of states. A welfare state premised on a fed-
eral-state system neglects those Americans who have national citizenship but
lack state residency. The two most prominent groups in this predicament are
members of tribes and residents of territories. In short, when the federal law
governing social provision relies on states, territorial residents cannot rely on
federal law.
C. Territories as American Public Law’s Outsiders
Before exploring the ways in which American public law treats the U.S.
territories as outsiders, it’s worth pausing briefly to clarify precisely which
territories are subject to this constitutional status and as a result which
Americans are the focus of this Article. Five American territories are
grouped under this heading: American Samoa, the CNMI, Guam, Puerto Ri-
co, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.90
• Puerto Rico looms the largest of this group by virtue of its popula-
tion and proximity to the rest of the United States. The United
States conquered Puerto Rico in the Spanish-American War, and
the Foraker Act in 1900 created a territorial government for the is-
land.91 A little more than 1,000 miles southeast of Florida and about
the size of Connecticut, Puerto Rico has a population of over 3 mil-
lion people, following significant out-migration in the last few
years.92 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, nearly 99% of Puerto
more specific ways in which powers are allocated between levels of government in particular
areas of policy—the terms of individual federal bargains . . . that arise out of the politics of par-
ticular policy debates.”).
90. The CNMI and Puerto Rico are technically considered commonwealths, while
American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are considered territories. There are other
islands over which the United States asserts jurisdiction; according to the U.S. Department of
Interior, these islands have “[n]o permanent population” but are “[p]eriodically inhabited by
military personnel or scientists.” How Are U.S. States, Territories, and Commonwealths Desig-
nated in the Geographic Names Information System?, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://
www.usgs.gov/faqs/how-are-us-states-territories-and-commonwealths-designated-geographic-
names-information-system?qt-news_science_products=0#qt-news_science_products [https://
perma.cc/H8UR-CLL7]. There are also the freely associated states of Micronesia, the Marshall
Islands, and Palau. See Compact of Free Association, Micr.-U.S., May 14, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 04-
625; Compact of Free Association, Marsh. Is.-U.S., Apr. 30, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 04-501; Com-
pact of Free Association, Palau-U.S., Jan. 10, 1986, Hein’s No. KAV 4303.
91. Organic (Foraker) Act of 1900, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 48 U.S.C.).
92. Antonio Flores & Jens Manuel Krogstad, Puerto Rico’s Population Declined Sharply
After Hurricanes Maria and Irma, PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACT TANK (July 26, 2019), https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/26/puerto-rico-population-2018 [https://perma.cc
/W8T7-M4DM]; Jaison R. Abel & Richard Deitz, The Causes and Consequences of Puerto Rico’s
Declining Population, 20 FED. RSRV. BANK N.Y. CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN.: SECOND DIST.
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Ricans identified as “Hispanic or Latino.”93 Most Puerto Ricans
identified as White during the last census.94
• Guam, like Puerto Rico, was conquered by the United States in the
Spanish-American War. Guam became an organized territory in
1950.95 Home to more than 150,000 people, Guam is about three
times the size of the District of Columbia. According to the U.S.
Census Bureau, the largest ethnic group is the Chamorros (indige-
nous to Guam and the CNMI) and the second is Chuukese (another
Micronesian ethnic group).96 There is a significant Filipino popula-
tion as well. Roughly 3,800 miles from Hawaii, Guam is the west-
ernmost territory of the United States.
• Acquired from Denmark in 1917, the U.S. Virgin Islands became an
organized American territory in 1936, and Congress passed a re-
vised organic act in 1954.97 Located roughly 45 miles east of Puerto
Rico and about 1,000 miles southeast of the continental United
States, the U.S. Virgin Islands include the three islands of St. Croix,
St. John, and St. Thomas. These islands make up about 134 square
miles of land—a little less than twice the area of the District of Co-
lumbia. Roughly 100,000 people reside there. According to the U.S.
Census Bureau, 76% of the population identifies as Black and 17.4%
identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish.98
• The Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) have been administered by
the United States since 1947, first pursuant to a United Nations res-
olution.99 Just north of Guam, the people of the Northern Mariana
Islands had by referendum voted to join with Guam, but in 1969
Guam rejected the proposal.100 The Northern Mariana Islands en-
tered into a covenant as a commonwealth territory in 1976.101 Near-
HIGHLIGHTS, no. 4, 2014, https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/current
_issues/ci20-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GNL-8MUQ].
93. Quick Facts, Puerto Rico, supra note 22.
94. Id.
95. Organic Act of Guam, ch. 512, 64 Stat. 384 (1950) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C.
§§ 1421–1424b).
96. GOWOROWSKA & WILSON, supra note 19, at 15.
97. Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, ch. 558, 68 Stat. 497 (1954) (codified as
amended at 48 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1645).
98. GOWOROWSKA & WILSON, supra note 19, at 18.
99. S.C. Res. 21, art. 2 (Apr. 2, 1947).
100. Pacific Islanders: Territorial Status and Representation, U.S. HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES.: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-
Publications/APA/Historical-Essays/Growing-Diversity/Pacific-Islanders [https://perma.cc
/J6Q7-7SHA].
101. Act of Mar. 24, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-241, 90 Stat. 263, 264 (codified as amended at
48 U.S.C. § 1801 note (Text of Covenant)); see also Exec. Order No. 12,572, 3 C.F.R. 239
(1986).
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ly half of the total population identifies as Asian, with Filipinos
making up the largest ethnic group.102 A third of the population
identifies as Pacific Islander, with Chamorros making up the most
numerous group within that designation.103 More than 50,000
Americans live on these fourteen islands.
• American Samoa has been an unincorporated U.S. territory since
1900.104 About 2,500 miles southwest of Hawaii in the South Pacific,
American Samoa consists of five main islands. The total land area is
slightly larger than the District of Columbia and home to roughly
more than 50,000 people. Most of the people in American Samoa
identify as Pacific Islanders, with Samoans making up the majority
of this group.105
With that context in mind, we can proceed to the legal framework that
governs these five territories. By and large, the legal academy tends to rele-
gate cases and controversies involving territories to the background of
American public law.106 Some historians have begun to discuss the United
States through the analytic lens of settler colonialism.107 Others have sought
to connect the Reconstruction struggle for full citizenship with the nation’s
fits and starts towards empire.108 This Section cannot detail all the history or
doctrinal developments that have led to territories being considered outside
the default arrangements of American public law, but this Section can show
102. GOWOROWSKA & WILSON, supra note 19, at 15.
103. Id.
104. See Instrument of Cession by the Representatives of the People of Tutuila, Tutuila-
U.S., Apr. 17, 1900, T.S. No. 314, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1929v01
/d853 [https://perma.cc/XB2U-K5XD]; see also Fitisemanu v. United States, 426 F. Supp. 3d
1155, 1170–74 (D. Utah 2019) (discussing the status of American Samoans’ rights following
the cessation treaty), argued, No. 20-4019 (10th Cir. Sept. 23, 2020). As noted above, American
Samoans are deemed “noncitizen nationals.” See supra note 16 and accompanying text; Mi-
chael Levenson, American Samoans Should Be Granted U.S. Citizenship, Judge Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/13/us/american-samoa-us-
citizenship.html [https://perma.cc/HV2K-UDDP].
105. GOWOROWSKA & WILSON, supra note 19, at 15.
106. See Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should Be Expanded to Include the Insular
Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241 (2000).
107. Paul A. Kramer, Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the
World, 116 AM. HIST. REV. 1348, 1361 (2011) (defining settler colonialism “as the seizure of
land and natural resources from indigenous populations, the politico-legal production of ‘terri-
tory,’ and governance through the rule of colonial difference”) (citing SETTLER COLONIALISM
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: PROJECTS, PRACTICES, LEGACIES (Caroline Elkins & Susan
Pedersen, eds., 2005)).
108. See ERMAN, supra note 49, at 3 (“[W]ell into the twentieth century, fights over the
past of Reconstruction and the future of empire were inextricably intertwined.”); Maggie
Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787
(2019) (connecting doctrinal developments to the treatment of indigenous peoples in the ser-
vice of American empire).
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how territorial Americans are placed outside the default arrangement of fed-
eral-state relations and, as a result, possess a status short of full citizenship.
Following the Civil War, the United States returned to its imperial ambi-
tions on the North American continent and beyond. Yet the Civil War’s legal
legacy meant the acquisition of territory demanded a different legal path
than it had in antebellum America. Now territorial expansion could only oc-
cur in a way that honored Reconstruction’s constitutional amendments and
civil rights statutes. But the promise of full, national citizenship enshrined in
the Fourteenth Amendment could not overcome the racial beliefs in each of
the branches of the national government at the turn of the twentieth century.
In the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court extended the sovereignty of the
United States to territories without requiring the full extension of constitu-
tional rights to those territories’ residents, providing a legal framework for
the United States to govern its unincorporated territories.109 Beginning with
Downes v. Bidwell in 1901 and arguably ending with Balzac v. Porto Rico in
1922, the Supreme Court construed the Constitution to permit Congress to
decide whether a newly acquired territory was “incorporated” into the Unit-
ed States or merely a “territory appurtenant” to the United States.110 This
formulation, first found in Justice Edward Douglas White’s concurrence in
Downes and then consolidated by Chief Justice Taft in Balzac, maintains that
residents of U.S. territories do not have the same rights as residents in the
states under the U.S. Constitution.111
The reasoning deployed by the Insular Cases has been repeatedly excori-
ated as suspect and racist.112 It is not a coincidence that eight of the Supreme
109. See generally RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE
AMERICAN EMPIRE (Gerald L. Neuman & Tomiko Brown-Nagin eds., 2015); Juan R. Torruella,
Ruling America’s Colonies: The Insular Cases, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 57 (2013).
110. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341–42 (1901) (White, J., concurring); Balzac v.
Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304–05 (1922). Downes v. Bidwell represents the origin of the doc-
trine of territorial incorporation, “under which the Constitution applies in full in incorporated
Territories surely destined for statehood but only in part in unincorporated Territories.”
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757 (2008); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-14-31, PUERTO RICO: INFORMATION ON HOW STATEHOOD WOULD POTENTIALLY
AFFECT SELECTED FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND REVENUE SOURCES 82 (2014).
111. Balzac, 258 U.S. 298 (holding that the Sixth Amendment jury right does not apply in
unincorporated territories); see also James T. Campbell, Note, Island Judges, 129 YALE L.J.
1888, 1944 (2020) (“The evolution of territorial courts since 1966 reveals that the justification
for their differentiation has collapsed.”); Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III
Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 581, 590 (1985) (“A traditional explanation is . . . that it was sensi-
ble not to require life-tenured judges for the territories because these lands would eventually
become states.”); Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., The Constitutional Structure of the Courts of the
United States Territories: The Case of American Samoa, 13 U. HAW. L. REV. 379, 384 (1991)
(discussing the origins of the constitutional doctrine under which Congress is not bound by
Article III when appointing federal judges in the U.S. territories).
112. See, e.g., Torruella, supra note 109, at 68 (“The rules established in the Insular Cases
were simply a more stringent version of the Plessy doctrine: the newly conquered lands were to
be treated not only separately, but also unequally.”); Doug Mack, The Strange Case of Puerto
Rico: How a Series of Racist Supreme Court Decisions Cemented the Island’s Second-Class Sta-
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Court justices who decided Downes v. Bidwell, one of the more infamous In-
sular Cases, also decided Plessy v. Ferguson.113 Indeed, the Court’s racist lan-
guage in Downes rhymes with its Jim Crow decisions when it characterizes
the people of Puerto Rico as an “alien race[], differing from us in religion,
customs, laws, methods of taxation and modes of thought” that are incom-
patible with “the administration of government and justice, according to
Anglo-Saxon principles.”114
Moreover, these territories are also constitutionally inferior to the Unit-
ed States’ eighteenth and nineteenth century territories, in part because there
is no expectation of eventual statehood.115 This status puts the territories in a
position different from the two most recently admitted states to the Union
(Hawai‘i116 and Alaska117) though they share some important connections on
the national government’s reluctance to incorporate indigenous populations
into the United States. As Professor Christina Ponsa-Kraus put it, the Insular
Cases “rendered these territories essentially invisible . . . [,] neither fully ‘do-
mestic’ nor fully ‘foreign’. . . [, and] devoid of both voting representation in
the federal government and independent status on the international
stage . . . . [A]t the top of nobody’s agenda,” the territories were “stripped of
the power to set their own.”118
tus, SLATE (Oct. 9, 2017, 5:45 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/10/the-insular-
cases-the-racist-supreme-court-decisions-that-cemented-puerto-ricos-second-class-
status.html [https://perma.cc/2MGT-BBU5].
113. See Downes, 182 U.S. 244; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Nor is it surprising that Justice John Marshall Har-
lan dissented in both cases. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 375–91 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Plessy, 163
U.S. at 552–64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
114. Downes, 182 U.S. at 287.
115. See Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases: A Declaration of Their Bankruptcy and My
Harvard Pronouncement, in RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES, supra note 109, at 64 (“Th[e]
doctrine . . . created two kinds of territories: first, incorporated territories, which as it turned
out, were all those acquired prior to the Spanish-American War and included Hawaii and
Alaska, and second, unincorporated ones, all of which happened to have been annexed after
the Spanish-American War, and which included Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Guam, and later,
the US Virgin Islands . . . .”); see also FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN
EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001);
JOSÉ A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE: NOTES ON THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP OF PUERTO RICANS (1979).
116. See generally ERMAN, supra note 49, at 21 (discussing Congress’s reluctance to annex
Hawaiʻi, in part, because it would necessarily guarantee full citizenship to Hawaiians under the
Fourteenth Amendment); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, COLONIZING HAWAIʻI: THE CULTURAL
POWER OF LAW (2000) (describing the law’s role in the American conquest of Hawaiʻi).
117. Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America by His
Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias to the United States of America, Russ.-U.S., Mar. 30,
1867, 18 Stat. 671, 673 (carving out an exception for “uncivilized native tribes”).
118. Christina Duffy Ponsa, When Statehood Was Autonomy, in RECONSIDERING THE
INSULAR CASES, supra note 109, at 2. Each of the five territories send nonvoting delegates to the
U.S. House of Representatives, but there are noteworthy political differences across the territo-
ries, including in the degree of self-government. See Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 302
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (pointing out that “the American Samoan territory is partially self-governed,
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While the territories are a heterogenous group across several dimen-
sions, they do share a certain level of economic deprivation compared to the
fifty states. The territories exhibit higher unemployment rates,119 lower me-
dian incomes,120 and weaker public infrastructure relative to the rest of the
United States.121 These territories are also particularly vulnerable to extreme
weather events, which have become increasingly acute due to climate
change.122 For instance, in 2017, Hurricane Irma, “one of the strongest and
costliest hurricanes on record in the Atlantic basin,”123 passed directly over
the Virgin Islands, causing “widespread catastrophic damage.”124 Two weeks
possessing a popularly elected bicameral legislature and similarly elected governor” but that
the territory “remains under the ultimate supervision of the Secretary of the Interior”) (citing
Exec. Order No. 10,264, 3 C.F.R. 447 (1951)). Nor does the difference in some territories being
referred to as “commonwealths” appear to impact welfare administration.
119. See, e.g., BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., USDL-19-2049, STATE
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT—OCTOBER 2019 (2019), https://www.bls.gov
/news.release/archives/laus_11192019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UPK-H4CP] (calculating Puerto
Rico’s October 2019 unemployment rate as higher than every state and the District of Colum-
bia and more than twice the national average).
120. See ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45235, ECONOMIC AND FISCAL
CONDITIONS IN THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS 3 (2020) (“Typical incomes in the USVI are lower
than on the U.S. mainland and poverty rates are higher.”)
121. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Earns a “D-” in ASCE Infrastructure Report Card, AM. SOC’Y
CIV. ENG’RS (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.asce.org/templates/press-release-detail.aspx?id
=34226 [https://perma.cc/F23S-4JVD].
122. See, e.g., Edward H. Allison & Hannah R. Bassett, Climate Change in the Oceans:
Human Impacts and Responses, 350 SCIENCE 778 (2017); Trevor C. Hall, Andrea M. Sealy,
Tannecia S. Stephenson, Shoji Kusunoki, Michael A. Taylor, A. Anthony Chen & Akio Kitoh,
Future Climate of the Caribbean from a Super-High-Resolution Atmospheric General Circula-
tion Model, 113 THEORETICAL & APPLIED CLIMATOLOGY 271 (2013); Nathan James Bennett,
Jessica Blythe, Stephen Tyler & Natalie C. Ban, Communities and Change in the Anthropocene:
Understanding Social-Ecological Vulnerability and Planning Adaptations to Multiple Interacting
Exposures, 16 REG’L ENV’T CHANGE 907 (2016); Kevon Rhiney, Geographies of Caribbean Vul-
nerability in a Changing Climate: Issues and Trends, 9 GEOGRAPHY COMPASS 97 (2015); Joshua
E. Cinner et al., Building Adaptive Capacity to Climate Change in Tropical Coastal Communi-
ties, 8 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 117 (2018); EPA, WHAT CLIMATE CHANGE MEANS FOR
GUAM (2016), https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09
/documents/climate-change-gu.pdf [https://perma.cc/WLM2-Z25F]; Kate Cimini, How Climate
Change Is Threatening the Navy’s Footprint in the Pacific, USA TODAY (June 28, 2018, 6:00
AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/06/28/climate-change-threatening-
navys-bases-pacific-guam/710979002 [https://perma.cc/P5QD-JAKE]; Hannah Magnuson,
U.S. Territory of Guam Fights the Ravages of Climate Change, PROGRESSIVE (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://progressive.org/dispatches/guam-fights-climate-change-magnuson-200130
[https://perma.cc/KLK7-HRHR]; Rebecca Hersher, Climate Change Was the Engine That Pow-
ered Hurricane Maria’s Devastating Rains, NPR (Apr. 17, 2019, 10:41 AM), https://www.npr
.org/2019/04/17/714098828/climate-change-was-the-engine-that-powered-hurricane-marias-
devastating-rains [https://perma.cc/LQA4-JBAB].
123. JOHN P. CANGIALOSI, ANDREW S. LATTO & ROBBIE BERG, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT:
HURRICANE IRMA 1 (2018), https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL112017_Irma.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6JU8-VZK5].
124. Id. at 14.
1662 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 119:1639
later, Hurricane Maria hit St. Croix before continuing on to devastate Puerto
Rico.125 The job losses following Hurricanes Irma and Maria in the U.S. Vir-
gin Islands and Puerto Rico exceeded the job losses in New York City during
the Great Recession.126
Today, except in American Samoa,127 federal law confers U.S. citizenship
on everyone born in these territories.128 Yet, due to the Insular Cases, citizen-
ship for these Americans raise other questions. If the Constitution does not
extend all the rights and privileges of citizenship to residents of American
territories, then which rights apply?129 The Supreme Court has characterized
congressional power over territories as plenary.130 The consequence of terri-
tories outside the constitutional scheme is to deliver them to the whims of
125. RICHARD J. PASCH, ANDREW B. PENNY & ROBBIE BERG, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER TROPICAL
CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE MARIA 2 (2019), https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr
/AL152017_Maria.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XVZ-K349].
126. See JASON BRAM, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., PUERTO RICO AND THE U.S. VIRGIN
ISLANDS AFTER HURRICANES IRMA AND MARIA 14 (2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org
/medialibrary/media/press/PressBriefing-PuertoRico-USVI-February222018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WH7K-R4ML].
127. See 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1); see also Fitisemanu v. United States, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1155,
1157 (D. Utah 2019) (discussing statutory recognition of American Samoans as noncitizen na-
tionals), argued, No. 20-4019 (10th Cir. Sept. 23, 2020).
128. 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (Puerto Rico); id. § 1406(b) (U.S. Virgin Islands); id. § 1407(b)
(Guam); 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note (Text of Covenant) (CNMI); see PEDRO A. MALAVET,
AMERICA’S COLONY: THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND PUERTO RICO 38–42 (2004); Pedro A. Malavet, The Inconvenience of a “Constitution
[That] Follows the Flag . . . but Doesn’t Quite Catch Up with It”: From Downes v. Bidwell to
Boumediene v. Bush, 80 MISS. L.J. 181 (2010); see also Rose Cuison Villazor, American Nation-
als and Interstitial Citizenship, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1673 (2017) (developing concept of the
“noncitizen national”); Christina Duffy Burnett, “They Say I Am Not an American . . .”: The
Noncitizen National and the Law of American Empire, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 659 (2008). See gener-
ally BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN
EMPIRE (2006); KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1989). Puerto Rico’s citizenship status is just one example. Kyle Dropp &
Brendan Nyhan, Nearly Half of Americans Don’t Know Puerto Ricans Are Fellow Citizens, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/upshot/nearly-half-of-
americans-dont-know-people-in-puerto-ricoans-are-fellow-citizens.html [https://perma.cc
/RW8A-5YG7]; cf. DANIEL IMMERWAHR, HOW TO HIDE AN EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF THE
GREATER UNITED STATES 261 (2019) (quoting one of Stephen Sondheim’s lyrics from West
Side Story, “Nobody knows in America, Puerto Rico’s in America”).
129. See Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Under the Insular
framework the designation of fundamental extends only to the narrow category of rights and
‘principles which are the basis of all free government.’ ”) (quoting Dorr v. United States, 195
U.S. 138, 147 (1904)).
130. See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
2 (granting Congress “Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respect-
ing the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States”). See generally ERMAN, su-
pra note 49, at 34 (describing how President McKinley and members of Congress settled on a
middle ground in which Congress would determine the status of Puerto Rico and the Philip-
pines).
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Congress, a national legislative body in which they are not represented.131
This lack of formal and meaningful representation in the federal government
means that territories are at a profound disadvantage with respect to relying
on the political process to advocate for their interests, including when it
comes to social protection.
As a result, Americans who live in U.S. territories lack both the political
safeguards that constitutional law associates with the federalism of the
American system and the fundamental rights jurisprudence that constitu-
tional law provides for “discrete and insular minorities.”132 By placing terri-
tories outside the default arrangement of American public law, the federal
government has built a dilapidated welfare state for Americans who happen
to be territorial residents.
In light of the earlier discussion, this arrangement should not surprise
us. After all, there are no capital “C” constitutional socioeconomic rights in
the United States.133 Many debate whether there are constitutional commit-
ments or whether there are social rights embedded in statutes, but those
scholarly conversations still agree on the primacy of Congress to instantiate
these protections for citizens, whether it is the Social Security Act of 1935 or
the pockmarked, but still powerful, Affordable Care Act of 2010.134 In this
way, residents of territories are not that dissimilar from other Americans in
having their social citizenship defined by statutes and regulations.135 The dif-
ference for these two groups is that the political safeguards upon which the
public law process depends are absent where territorial Americans’ welfare is
at issue.
To restate, social citizenship is an apt framework for understanding the
federal programs that are the focus of this Article, both as they relate to citi-
zens and institutions. Yet this framework is contested, and it operates within
an American tradition that has equated whiteness with deservingness and
systematically excluded Black Americans, indigenous Americans, immigrant
groups, and territorial Americans. This Part has tried to show that we should
not define an individual’s status in a polity solely on the basis of the political
and civil rights typically associated with liberal constitutionalism but should
also incorporate social protections that define modern life. That concept of
social citizenship is in tension with a public law system that allows subna-
tional units to provide drastically different services and levels of benefits. A
safety net premised on a federal-state system neglects those Americans who
have national citizenship but lack state residency, especially residents of ter-
131. Territories have delegates in the House of Representatives, but they cannot vote.
CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40555, DELEGATES TO THE U.S. CONGRESS:
HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS 6 (2015).
132. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
133. See Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 61, at 1808–09.
134. See, e.g., Luke Norris, The Workers’ Constitution, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1459, 1481–
91 (2019).
135. See infra Part IV.
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ritories. As the next Part shows, this is not simply a difference in form. The
fact that Americans in territories are outside the default arrangement of so-
cial provision in the United States carries profound consequences for their
lives and their ability to weather the inevitable hazards of our society, such as
getting sick, caring for a loved one, losing a job, and growing old. And the
lack of political representation in our national government leaves these
Americans especially vulnerable to federal experimentation, disregard, and
outright cuts.
II. TERRITORIAL WELFARE ADMINISTRATION
As described in Part I, the economic situation of the U.S. territories—
combined with their particular vulnerabilities to climate change—means that
territorial residents endure a level of need that rivals the poorest areas in the
continental United States.136 As a result, how the federal and territorial gov-
ernments provide basic services is critically important to the people of these
five territories. What follows in this Part is an analysis of how the federal
government funds and territories administer food, medical, cash, and disa-
bility assistance.
When scholars enumerate the dimensions of social citizenship, they of-
ten agree on basic needs like food and medical assistance, while others add
housing and education.137 The demands of an all-embracing account would
overwhelm a single law review article, but this Article can discuss how feder-
al law addresses the needs of territorial Americans when it comes to disabil-
ity, food, and medical assistance. As a result, this Article focuses on the three
means-tested public assistance programs in the United States designed to
address these needs: Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Along with the Earned In-
come Tax Credit,138 these public benefit programs reach more Americans
136. See, e.g., BREAD FOR THE WORLD, FACT SHEET: HUNGER AND POVERTY IN PUERTO
RICO (2019), https://www.bread.org/sites/default/files/hunger-poverty-puerto-rico-march-
2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/J546-88VK]; Brian Glassman, A Third of Movers from Puerto Rico
to the Mainland United States Relocated to Florida in 2018, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: AM. COUNTS
(Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/09/puerto-rico-outmigration-
increases-poverty-declines.html [https://perma.cc/T99B-9LUJ].
137. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text.
138. The EITC would be another candidate to include, but territorial residents do not pay
federal income taxes and Puerto Ricans only began to qualify for the federal EITC a couple
months ago. See American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 9625, 135 Stat. 4, 155
(to be codified at I.R.C. § 7530); SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44651, TAX POLICY AND
U.S. TERRITORIES: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2016). Importantly, Puerto Rico im-
plemented its own EITC a couple of years ago to reduce poverty among its people. ROSANNA
TORRES & JAVIER BALMACEDA, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, WHY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT SHOULD SUPPORT PUERTO RICO’S NEW EITC (2019), https://www.cbpp
.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-14-19tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQZ4-2LMX] (pointing
out that the maximum annual credit for a single parent with two children in Puerto Rico is
$1,500, compared to $5,828 for the federal EITC).
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than any other means-tested program139 and after Social Security and Medi-
care represent the largest antipoverty expenditures in the federal budget.140
Over the last fifty years, Medicaid, SNAP, and SSI have grown dramati-
cally. While weaknesses in each program remain, including complicated ap-
plications, outdated asset tests,141 and some unnecessary state variation, each
of these programs has become more generous and standardized, and they
139. As one official from the U.S. Government Accountability Office once explained it to
Congress, “[m]eans-tested programs are restricted to individuals or families whose income
falls below defined levels and who meet certain other eligibility criteria established for each
program. To qualify for assistance, applicants generally must show proof of income and other
documentation, which administering agencies must then verify.” U.S. GOV’T ACCT. OFF.,
GAO/T-HEHS-95-76, MEANS-TESTED PROGRAMS: AN OVERVIEW, PROBLEMS, AND ISSUES 1
(1995). The most recent data available for SNAP and Medicaid are from September 2020. Sev-
enty-one million people received Medicaid in March. See 2020 09 Updated Applications, Eligi-
bility Determinations, and Enrollment Data, MEDICAID.GOV, https://data.medicaid.gov
/Enrollment/2020-09-Updated-applications-eligibility-determina/25zg-3gg8 [https://perma.cc
/UT76-6U2B]. Nearly forty-three million people received SNAP that same month. SNAP Data
Tables, U.S DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV. (May 16, 2021), https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/resource-files/34SNAPmonthly-5.pdf [https://perma.cc
/9FCT-DDKH]; see also Manasi Deshpande, Does Welfare Inhibit Success? The Long-Term Ef-
fects of Removing Low-Income Youth from the Disability Rolls, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 3300, 3300
(2016) (describing SSI as “the largest nonwork-based cash welfare program in the United
States”); TANF Caseload Data 2020, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. OFF. FAM.
ASSISTANCE, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/resource/tanf-caseload-data-2020 [https://perma.cc
/VB29-PB2J]; WIC Data Tables, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., https://
www.fns.usda.gov/pd/wic-program [https://perma.cc/PV4U-A5ZB]; HUD User Datasets, U.S.
DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV., https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdrdatas_landing.html#dataset-
title [https://perma.cc/QB6Z-T2XG].
140. See Mandatory Spending in 2019: An Infographic, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Apr. 15,
2020), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56325 [https://perma.cc/N3AG-4GE2]. For an over-
view of the federal budget process, see GRANT A. DRIESSEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45202, THE
FEDERAL BUDGET: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR FY2019 AND BEYOND (2018). After Social Secu-
rity and Medicare, Medicaid is the most expensive domestic program in the federal budget. See
National Health Expenditure Data: Historical, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports
/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical [https://perma.cc/TK99-
567Z]; Alex Boucher & Barb Rosewicz, Medicaid Consumes Growing Slice of States’ Dollars,
PEW (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2015/04
/medicaid-consumes-growing-slice-of-states-dollars [https://perma.cc/4WZC-TMNA]. The
Social Security Administration reports close to $56 billion spent on SSI last fiscal year. SOC.
SEC. ADMIN., BUDGET OVERVIEW, FY 2021 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 3 fig.1,
https://www.ssa.gov/budget/FY21Files/2021BO.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XG7-NNEM]. I focused
on these programs, along with TANF, in an earlier article on immigrants and their families’
ability to access public benefits in the United States. See Andrew Hammond, The Immigration-
Welfare Nexus in a New Era?, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 501, 504–07 (2018).
141. See Pamela Foohey & Sara S. Greene, How Government Rules Prevent Poor Ameri-
cans from Saving, POLITICO: THE AGENDA (Sept. 3, 2020, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com
/news/agenda/2020/09/03/how-government-keeps-poor-from-saving-407839 [https://perma
.cc/Z9GH-SSCM].
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have proven more difficult to cut than we might expect.142 For Medicaid and
SNAP, that’s in part because the fiscal federalism of these programs encour-
ages state policymakers to broaden access to continue receiving federal fund-
ing for these programs.143 For all three programs, the federal courts have also
served as useful fora for benefit recipients to challenge unlawful agency ac-
tion.144 While it is important to not overstate the strengths of these pro-
grams, especially compared to antipoverty efforts in other wealthy
democracies, it is also important to keep in mind that these programs have
matured into crucial supports for low-income Americans.
A. Medical Assistance
1. The Federal Framework
Medicaid is the national healthcare program for low-income Americans.
The federal expenditures of nearly $600 billion a year for the program exceed
any other domestic spending, save Medicare and Social Security.145 It now
accounts for one in every six dollars spent on health care.146 As discussed
above, for Medicaid to function the federal government requires states to
contribute their own funding and administer the program in a manner that
comports with various federal statutory and regulatory requirements.147 The
federal government pays a fixed percentage ranging from 50% to nearly 78%
of most Medicaid costs.148 That federal formula allows for a higher match for
the Affordable Care Act expansion population and some other costs, as well
as the standard 50% match for administrative costs.149 States, in turn, have to
enroll certain eligible groups, provide certain benefits, and follow statutory
142. I develop this argument at length as it relates to Medicaid and SNAP in Litigating
Welfare Rights: Medicaid, SNAP, and the Legacy of the New Property, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 361,
377–86 (2020).
143. See id. at 426–29.
144. See id. at 387–97; see also, e.g., Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990); Colon v. Ap-
fel, 133 F. Supp. 2d 330, 337–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (recounting the attempted congressional over-
ride of Sullivan).
145. Robin Rudowitz, Kendal Orgera & Elizabeth Hinton, Medicaid Financing: The Ba-
sics, KFF (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-financing-the-
basics [https://perma.cc/Y4SR-MR5T]; see DRIESSEN, supra note 140, at 7 (“The largest manda-
tory programs, Social Security, Medicare, and the federal share of Medicaid, constituted 48% of
all federal spending in FY2017.”).
146. Rudowitz et al., supra note 145.
147. Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 446–47 (2011)
(describing states’ role).
148. Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) for Medicaid and Multiplier: FY 2021,
KFF, https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/federal-matching-rate-and-multiplier
[https://perma.cc/Q4UK-KUE4].
149. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID
FINANCING: AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL MEDICAID MATCHING RATE (FMAP) 1 (2012),
https://www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/8352.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GCT-C2HE].
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requirements. But beyond those federal requirements, states have multiple
options to cover additional people and services and decide how they want to
deliver healthcare services.150
2. Territories as a Medicaid Exception
The most significant difference between Medicaid in the states and Med-
icaid in the territories is the latter’s lower level of federal support.151 The ter-
ritories receive a lower federal matching rate for Medicaid spending than
most states do.152 For instance, Puerto Rico’s federal match rate is set by
statute at 55%, a much lower rate than it would be if the rate were based, as it
is for states, on per capita income.153 Under the Social Security Act, each ter-
ritory is provided what is sometimes referred to as “base funding” to serve
their Medicaid populations.154 However, instead of receiving federal match-
ing funds for all medical assistance provided to eligible people as states do,
the territories are subject to a hard cap on federal matching funds.155 Thus,
there is a certain limit at which the federal government will not finance fur-
ther health assistance to Americans who live in the territories.156 Such a cap
150. While states have some discretion in tailoring their own programs, especially
through waivers, these efforts have been blocked in federal court. See Hammond, supra note
142, at 407–18 (discussing the Medicaid work requirements litigation).
151. Admittedly, Medicaid exhibits significant variation in the states, especially following
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). See Nicole Huberfeld, The Universali-
ty of Medicaid at Fifty, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 67, 73 (2015). I take up this issue
in Part IV.
152. Another way in which Americans in the territories receive deficient medical assis-
tance compared to those in the states is that elderly Americans who live in the territories are
not eligible for Medicare Low-Income Subsidies. Despite not having access to this assistance
through Medicare, the territories can sometimes use Medicaid to provide access to prescription
drugs. See ANNIE L. MACH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44275, PUERTO RICO AND HEALTH CARE
FINANCE: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 20, 22 (2016).
153. The Affordable Care Act increased it from the previous rate of 50%. Samantha Arti-
ga, Cornelia Hall, Robin Rudowitz & Barbara Lyons, Health Care in Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands: A Six-Month Check-Up After the Storms (Report), KFF (Apr. 24, 2018)
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/health-care-in-puerto-rico-and-the-u-s-virgin-
islands-a-six-month-check-up-after-the-storms-report [https://perma.cc/ASW6-NKT6]. Sec-
tion 2005 of the ACA approved $5.5 billion in Medicaid funding for Puerto Rico from July 1,
2011 to September 30, 2019. The Medicaid allotment was capped at $321 million, but Puerto
Rico used another $803 million from the ACA funding. See MACH, supra note 152, at 26–27.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1308(b)(1) (laying out the Medicaid annual grant formula for the territo-
ries).
155. Id. § 1308(c)(2)–(4) (defining and setting “mandatory ceiling amount” for each ter-
ritory); id. § 1308(b)(1); see also LARA MERLING & JAKE JOHNSTON, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y
RSCH., MORE TROUBLE AHEAD: PUERTO RICO’S IMPENDING MEDICAID CRISIS 1 (2017),
http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/puerto-rico-medicaid-2017-10.pdf [https://perma.cc
/XN3N-22FX] (describing the Puerto Rico cap “first set by the US Congress in 1968”).
156. See Lizette Alvarez & Abby Goodnough, Puerto Ricans Brace for Crisis in Health
Care, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/03/us/health-providers-
brace-for-more-cuts-to-medicare-in-puerto-rico.html [https://perma.cc/YGP4-QNN8]; Maria
1668 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 119:1639
also means that the effective matching is even lower.157 If the federal expend-
itures for Puerto Rico’s Medicaid were not capped, and were calculated using
the same formula used for the fifty states, the federal matching rate would be
83%.158 Similarly, American Samoa, Guam, the CNMI, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands receive federal Medicaid funding at a lower matching rate than the
fifty states until they hit the cap.159
Furthermore, the statutory cap on territorial Medicaid funding has not
grown at the same rate as the Medicaid program in the states.160 Federal
funding for Medicaid in the territories would be even greater if the federal
government applied the standard federal poverty measurement to the terri-
tories. But the federal government applies different poverty metrics to the
territories, and Puerto Rico’s, for instance, has not been updated to reflect
inflation since 1998.161 Even though the federal government funds Medicaid
at a lower rate in the territories than it does in the states, a greater share of
territorial residents have incomes that qualify for Medicaid. For example,
approximately three-quarters of American Samoans are estimated to have
Levis, The Price of Inequality for Puerto Rico, HEALTH AFFS. (Dec. 29, 2015),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20151229.052430/full [https://perma.cc/4WCD
-9KWR]; Juan R. Torruella, Why Puerto Rico Does Not Need Further Experimentation with Its
Future: A Reply to the Notion of “Territorial Federalism,” 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 65, 104 (2018).
157. EDWIN PARK, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, ADDRESSING PUERTO RICO’S
MEDICAID FUNDING SHORTFALLS WOULD HELP ENSURE FISCAL STABILITY AND GROWTH 2
(2016), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/9-19-16health.pdf [https://perma
.cc/4CBG-CLC8].
158. JUDITH SOLOMON, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, PUERTO RICO’S MEDICAID
PROGRAM NEEDS AN ONGOING COMMITMENT OF FEDERAL FUNDS 1 (2019),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/4-22-19health.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2SF-
43DN]; see Torruella, supra note 156, at 91–92 (discussing how Puerto Rico had to cover short-
falls in federal funding for Medicaid).
159. See United States Virgin Islands: Medicaid Overview, MEDICAID.GOV, https://
www.medicaid.gov/state-overviews/usvi.html [https://perma.cc/XX7L-UDYK]; Guam: Medi-
caid Overview, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/state-overviews/guam.html [https://
perma.cc/62RS-U4UT]. Unlike the other U.S. territories, American Samoa operates its Medi-
caid program under a separate waiver. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(j). This provision allows Ameri-
can Samoa’s Medicaid program to waive almost any federal requirement except the cap, the
statutory matching rate (the FMAP), and the enumerated types of care and services described
in section 1905(a) of the Social Security Act. See id. § 1396d(a); see also American Samoa: Med-
icaid Overview, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/state-overviews/american-
samoa.html [https://perma.cc/USM6-VRJL]; MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N,
FACTSHEET: MEDICAID AND CHIP IN AMERICAN SAMOA (2020), https://www.macpac.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/Medicaid-and-CHIP-in-American-Samoa.pdf [https://perma.cc
/S2CD-4KM5] (“American Samoa is exempt from all Medicaid data and reporting require-
ments under its Section 1902(j) waiver.”); Fili Sagapolutele, American Samoa Governor Says
Small Economies ‘Cannot Afford Any Reduction In Medicaid,’ PAC. ISLANDS REP. (Mar. 2, 2017,
2:31 PM), http://www.pireport.org/articles/2017/03/02/american-samoa-governor-says-small-
economies-cannot-afford-any-reduction [https://perma.cc/A38H-T7BR].
160. See Vann R. Newkirk II, The Historical Exclusion Behind the Puerto Rico Bankruptcy
Crisis, ATLANTIC (May 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05
/medicaid-funding-cap-puerto-rico/524973 [https://perma.cc/5RK2-9F9E].
161. See SOLOMON, supra note 158.
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incomes below 200% of the federal poverty level, the top-line means test for
Medicaid.162 Medicaid covers almost half of Puerto Rico’s population;163 ap-
proximately half of Puerto Rico’s 3.2 million residents receive their medical
care through a combination of Medicaid and Puerto Rico’s other public pro-
grams.164 Given the funding constraints, Puerto Rico is only able to provide
ten of Medicaid’s seventeen mandatory services.165 This is especially prob-
lematic in light of Puerto Ricans’ higher rates of health problems, including
heart disease, diabetes, disability, and infant mortality.166
B. Food Assistance
1. The Federal Framework
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is the main federal
assistance program that helps low-income households purchase food. Like
Medicaid, SNAP benefits are considered an entitlement—a state needs to
cover every eligible household which applies for the benefit.167 SNAP house-
holds may use the benefit to purchase food at grocery stores and retailers au-
thorized by the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) to participate in the
program. Federal law sets national eligibility rules and benefit amounts for
food assistance.168 SNAP’s benefit formula calculates that families will spend
30% of their net income on food.169 Households with no net income receive
the maximum amount per month ($504 for a family of three), but the aver-
162. MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, supra note 159.
163. PARK, supra note 157. Puerto Rico also uses an eligibility threshold based on a local
poverty line that is roughly 40% of the federal poverty line. SOLOMON, supra note 158.
164. PARK, supra note 157; see also Selena Simmons-Duffin, America’s ‘Shame’: Medicaid
Funding Slashed in U.S. Territories, NPR (Nov. 20, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org
/sections/health-shots/2019/11/20/780452645/americas-shame-medicaid-funding-slashed-in-
u-s-territories [https://perma.cc/JH26-UHHX].
165. MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, FACTSHEET: MEDICAID AND
CHIP IN PUERTO RICO (2020), https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/07
/Medicaid-and-CHIP-in-Puerto-Rico.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP7E-66S8]. As will be discussed
below, Congress has passed additional temporary funding for Medicaid. See infra Section III.B.
166. Artiga et al., supra note 153.
167. See 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a). SNAP benefits are provided on a “household” basis. A SNAP
“household” means “an individual who lives alone or who, while living with others, customari-
ly purchases food and prepares meals for home consumption separate and apart from the oth-
ers; or . . . a group of individuals who live together and customarily purchase food and prepare
meals together for home consumption.” Id. § 2012(m)(1).
168. See id. § 2014(c)–(d) (outlining gross income test and exclusions from income); id.
§ 2017(a) (providing for calculation of the benefit amount). To qualify for benefits, a SNAP
household’s income must be at or below 130% of the federal poverty level, the household’s net
monthly income (after deductions for other major expenses like housing and childcare) must
be less than or equal to 100% of the federal poverty level, and its assets must fall below limits
set by the USDA. See id. § 2014(c)–(e), (g).
169. See id. § 2017(a).
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age monthly benefit is roughly half that ($253).170 The average monthly benefit
per person is $125 a month or $1.40 per meal.171 It is not surprising, then, that
most SNAP benefits are spent within the first half of a given month.172
2. Territories as a SNAP Exception
All fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Is-
lands participate in SNAP. But federal law excludes Puerto Rico, American
Samoa, and the CNMI from participating in SNAP. Instead, these territories
receive a capped block grant for basic food assistance. In other words, the
United States has a national food assistance scheme for all Americans except
those who live in certain territories.173 The following subsection digs deeper
into how the three territories navigate nutrition assistance.
The Food Stamp Program had previously operated in Puerto Rico, put-
ting its food stamp program on the same footing as the states’ programs.174
As part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, President Reagan
and Congress removed Puerto Rico from the national food assistance
scheme and created a separate program, the Nutrition Assistance Program
(NAP).175 NAP was permanently authorized in 1985 and continues to be
how American citizens in Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and the CNMI re-
ceive food assistance. While the block grant is referred to as NAP in each of
these territories, the rules vary across each.
170. KATHRYN CRONQUIST, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., REPORT NO. SNAP-19-CHAR,
CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM HOUSEHOLDS: FISCAL
YEAR 2018, at 9, 45, 109 (2019).
171. See id. at 118.
172. Karen S. Hamrick & Margaret Andrews, SNAP Participants’ Eating Patterns over the
Benefit Month: A Time Use Perspective, PLOS ONE (2016), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal
.pone.0158422 [https://perma.cc/QKT3-AHHV].
173. See ANNE PETERSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ASSESSING THE FEASIBILITY OF
IMPLEMENTING SNAP IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS 1–2
(2016), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ops/SNAPCNMI.pdf [https://perma
.cc/GR9J-UYYB] (describing how federal legislation gave USDA the authority to fund food
assistance in the CNMI via a block grant). SNAP also does not reach members of the more
than 250 federally recognized tribes that participate in a commodity food distribution program
(FDPIR). See FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOOD DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM
ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS (2020), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/resource-
files/fdpir-program-fact-sheet-2020-for%20website.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4PR-LYJB].
174. Food Stamp Act of 1964 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 91-671, sec. 2(c), § 3(j), 84 Stat.
2048, 2048 (1971) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 2012(s)).
175. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 116, 95 Stat. 357,
364–66. Most sources suggest Congress was motivated to remove Puerto Rico from the food
stamps program as part of a broader effort to cut the cost of the program. See, e.g., BRYNNE
KEITH-JENNINGS & ELIZABETH WOLKOMIR, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, HOW DOES
HOUSEHOLD FOOD ASSISTANCE IN PUERTO RICO COMPARE TO THE REST OF THE UNITED
STATES? (2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-27-17fa.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YY53-7CT3].
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The NAP block grants and SNAP share the same purpose: “to provide
low-income households with access to a nutritious diet through increased
food purchasing power.”176 However, the delivery and size of the two bene-
fits differ. When Congress created NAP grants, the Food Stamp Program was
still coupon-based. NAP, by contrast, was cash-based. Compared to SNAP,
the food assistance program for these territories had stricter eligibility re-
quirements and smaller benefit amounts. However, because NAP was cash-
based, there were fewer restrictions on what recipients could purchase with
the benefit.177 NAP determines eligibility based on net income and asset lim-
its.178
Another notable difference between NAP and SNAP is that NAP origi-
nally permitted a small portion of the monthly allowance to be redeemed for
cash.179 However, the 2014 Farm Bill mandated a gradual phaseout of the
cash withdrawal option, and starting this fiscal year, no benefits will be in the
form of cash.180 SNAP recipients can use their EBT card to purchase plants
and seeds that produce food but not prepared meals for immediate con-
sumption (with some exceptions).181
Territorial food assistance also uses different income calculations. For
instance, NAP has no set gross income limits.182 The net income level,
though, is lower than SNAP.183 But the benefit levels are also different. The
maximum monthly food assistance benefits for these territorial residents are
roughly 60% of the maximum monthly benefits under SNAP.184
176. MARY KAY FOX, WILLIAM HAMILTON & BIING-HWAN LIN, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
NO. 19-3, EFFECTS OF FOOD ASSISTANCE AND NUTRITION PROGRAMS ON NUTRITION AND
HEALTH: VOLUME 3, LITERATURE REVIEW 286 (2004), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs
/publications/46556/30240_fanrr19-3_002.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6Y6-N3EH]; ANNE
PETERSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., IMPLEMENTING SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN PUERTO RICO: A FEASIBILITY STUDY 54 (2010), https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/PuertoRico.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z26H-UM77].
177. See FOX ET AL., supra note 176, at 286–91 (noting the research gaps relating to the
impacts of NAP).
178. Nutrition Assistance for Puerto Rico, BENEFITS.GOV, https://www.benefits.gov
/benefits/benefit-details/363 [https://perma.cc/QTE6-KV6K]. While “SNAP considers earned
income from wages, salaries, tips, commissions, self-employment, and independent contract-
ing, as well as unearned income[,] NAP considers similar categories of income but applies
more exemptions and exclusions to some income categories.” KEITH-JENNINGS & WOLKOMIR,
supra note 175, at 8 n.28.
179. PETERSON ET AL., supra note 176, at C-14.
180. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., EXPLANATORY NOTES—FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE 34-
92 (2021), https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/32fns2021notes.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XR76-V6Y9]
181. PETERSON ET AL., supra note 176, at 42.
182. Id. at C-11 to C-12.
183. Id. at C-12.
184. See KEITH-JENNINGS & WOLKOMIR, supra note 175, at 12; PETERSON ET AL., supra
note 176, at C-4. To be sure, not every recipient receives the maximum benefit under either
program, so it may not translate into similar benefit disparities across all households.
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As a result, the food assistance programs in these three territories are
unable to provide sufficient assistance in the face of natural disaster and re-
cessions because unlike SNAP, which operates under the entitlement struc-
ture, it cannot serve all applicants that meet eligibility requirements.185 Thus,
these three territories are disadvantaged with respect to household food as-
sistance. Unlike the rest of the United States citizenry, Americans who live in
these three territories do not have access to a food assistance program that
can expand and contract to accommodate changing need.
C. Disability Assistance
1. The Federal Framework
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a cash benefit received by over
eight million Americans who are elderly, blind, or have a disability as de-
fined by federal law.186 The maximum monthly SSI benefit for an individual
recipient is set at $794 and is not based on a recipient’s prior earnings.187
Furthermore, the income threshold is set nationwide and the asset test is
much lower than other means-tested programs.188 Notably, SSI recipients
who live alone, or where all household members receive SSI, are eligible for
SNAP and typically eligible for Medicaid.189 Lastly, as a part of the larger So-
cial Security apparatus, SSI recipients have the same recourse to administra-
tive procedure as recipients of benefits through the Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) program.190
185. KEITH-JENNINGS & WOLKOMIR, supra note 175, at 1.
186. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a); see also Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 541 (1990) (ruling
that SSI determinations for claims by children were inconsistent with the “comparable severi-
ty” standard of the Social Security Act); CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS:
SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME 1 (2020) https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms
/files/PolicyBasics_SocSec-IntroToSSI.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7B9-QKDP].
187. SSI Federal Payment Amounts for 2021, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/oact
/cola/SSI.html [https://perma.cc/G8QZ-FJQM].
188. See id. The asset limit has not been raised since 1984. JACK SMALLIGAN & CHANTEL
BOYENS, URB. INST., IMPROVING THE SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM FOR
ADULTS WITH DISABILITIES 18 (2019), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication
/100096/improving_the_supplemental_security_income_program_for_adults_with_disabilitie
s.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3NW-HUKL].
189. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP)
FACTS https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10101.pdf [https://perma.cc/EF7T-RV47]; Kalman
Rupp & Gerald F. Riley, State Medicaid Eligibility and Enrollment Policies and Rates of Medi-
caid Participation Among Disabled Supplemental Security Income Recipients, 76 SOC. SEC.
BULL., no. 3, 2016, at 17.
190. Disability Evaluation Under Social Security, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov
/disability/professionals/bluebook/general-info.htm [https://perma.cc/2PWQ-GBAS].
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2. Territories as an SSI Exception
The SSI program operates in the fifty states, the District of Columbia,
and the CNMI.191 Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have no
SSI program. SSI benefits are not available to these territorial residents. In-
stead, these Americans are eligible to receive federally funded benefits
through the Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (AABD) programs that SSI
replaced.192 And neither AABD nor SSI operates in American Samoa.193
History provides needed context as to how this came to pass. Prior to
1950, no federal Social Security payments were made to residents of Puerto
Rico or the U.S. Virgin Islands. Congress debated whether to extend public
benefits to both territories.194 Ultimately, the enacted bill, H.R. 6000, meant
that employment in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands would be cov-
ered through Social Security’s contributory programs, and Puerto Rico and
the U.S. Virgin Islands were treated like states.195 The Social Security
Amendments also meant that Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands were
able to administer the AABD programs similar to states.196 In 1958, Congress
extended AABD to Guam.197 The fifty states and the District of Columbia
also operated AABD into the 1970s.
In 1972, Congress replaced, and President Nixon signed into law, the
various state-administered AABD programs with a national means-tested
disability program called Supplemental Security Income (SSI).198 Congress
excluded Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico from SSI,199 but ex-
tended eligibility to residents of the Northern Mariana Islands a few years
191. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381–1383f; GREEN BOOK, supra note 29.
192. GREEN BOOK, supra note 29.
193. Id. (“Residents of American Samoa are not eligible for SSI or benefits under the
aged, blind, and disabled grants.”).
194. WILLIAM R. MORTON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., MEMORANDUM: CASH ASSISTANCE FOR
THE AGED, BLIND, AND DISABLED IN PUERTO RICO 14 (2016).
195. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, sec. 104(a), § 210(h), 64 Stat. 477, 500.
196. See MORTON, supra note 194.
197. See Chronology: 1600s–1800s, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/history
/1950.html [https://perma.cc/RE64-RFXQ].
198. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, sec. 301, §§ 1601–
1634, 86 Stat. 1329, 1465–78 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381–1383f).
199. Social Security Amendments of 1972 § 303(a). Section 303(a) repealed Titles I, X,
and XIV of the Social Security Act, and section 301 amended Title XVI to create the SSI pro-
gram effective on January 1, 1974. Id. However, section 303(b) provided that the repeals and
amendments made to the aforementioned titles do not apply to Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, and Guam. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 301 note (Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin
Islands)). Consequently, SSI was not extended to the territories. Guam and the U.S. Virgin Is-
lands continue to operate Old-Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, and Aid to the Permanently
and Totally Disabled under Titles I, X, and XIV, while Puerto Rico continues to operate Aid to
the Aged, Blind, or Disabled (AABD) under Title XVI.
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later.200 There are some exceptions for children who live in one of the ex-
cluded territories but whose parents are serving in the U.S. military.201 The
federal government still provides funding to the territories to help pay for
costs of providing cash assistance to the needy, aged, blind, or disabled, but
this funding is significantly less than comparable expenditures for SSI.202
Federal matching grants help fund these disability assistance programs
so long as the territories meet certain statutory criteria. To qualify for federal
matching grants, a territory must submit a plan to the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services assuring the federal government that the pro-
gram will be administered in conformity with federal law.203 Territories can
set the income thresholds and the benefit levels for the programs. The feder-
al government will provide 75% of benefit payments, with the territories pay-
ing 25%.204 But as with food assistance and healthcare, federal law caps
AABD assistance for the territories. This ceiling of support is set by statute
and does not reflect inflation.205
200. Act of Mar. 24, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-241, 90 Stat. 263, 268 (codified as amended at
48 U.S.C. § 1801 note (Text of Covenant)).
201. See SOC. SEC. BULL.: ANN. STAT. SUPPLEMENT 18 (2000). One such exception allows
for SSI eligibility to be continued for
a disabled or blind child who was receiving SSI benefits while living in the United States
and is now living with a parent who is a member of the U.S. Armed Forces assigned to
permanent duty ashore outside the United States, but not where the parent is stationed
in Puerto Rico or the territories and possessions of the United States.
Id. That provision was extended to a child whose parent is a member of the U.S. armed forces
and stationed in Puerto Rico or the territories and possessions of the United States. Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-66, sec. 13734, § 1614(a)(1)(B)(ii), 107 Stat.
312, 662 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1)(B)(ii)).
202. MORTON, supra note 194, at 4, 12. Specifically, the federal government provides
funding to “the separate programs of Old-Age Assistance (OAA; Title I), Aid to the Blind (AB;
Title X), and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD; Title XIV); [and] the single
program of Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled (AABD; Title XVI).” Id. at 4.
203. Id. at 6.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 6–7.
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TABLE 1: FOOD, MEDICAL, AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE




























































































As one can see from Table 1, no American territory can lay claim to a
safety net that is comparable to any of the fifty states or the District of Co-
lumbia. Some territories have access to one of the federal public benefits:
Americans in Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands have access to SNAP, and
Northern Mariana Islanders have access to SSI. But by and large, Americans
who reside in territories face limited federal funding for food, medical, or
disability assistance. Consequently, no territory can provide basic services with
the kind of federal support states enjoy, and those Americans who do receive
assistance in the territories typically receive much lower levels of support.
206. For substantive discussion of each relevant category, see supra Section II.B.2 (re-
garding food assistance); supra Section II.A.2 (regarding medical assistance); supra Section
II.C.2 (regarding disability assistance).
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TABLE 2: MAXIMUM GRANTS FOR AMERICANS FOR
FOOD AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE







. $535 for 48 states & D.C.;











$127 per person No program
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$541 (average benefit $541 per
household)





















$688 Unavailable (average grant was$176 in 2011)
As one can see from Table 2, a three-person household in one of lower
48 states could receive up to $535 in food assistance. A three-person house-
207. Unless otherwise stated, all figures are based on assistance for a three-person house-
hold. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SNAP—FISCAL YEAR 2021 COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENTS (2020),
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/resource-files/COLAMemoFY2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E45D-LKK7]; KEITH-JENNINGS & WOLKOMIR, supra note 175, at 12; U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 180, at 34-92 to -93.
208. MORTON, supra note 194, at 4, 10, 21 tbl.8; SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM 7 (2020); SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUB. NO. 13-
11827, SSI ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, 2019, at 24 tbl.5 (2020), https://www.ssa.gov/policy
/docs/statcomps/ssi_asr/2019/sect02.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7LS-R22G].
209. Email from Miles Patrie, Food & Nutrition Serv., to author (Sept. 17, 2020, 9:27
AM) (on file with author).
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hold in Puerto Rico receives $315 in food assistance, but forty-five miles
away, a similar household in the U.S. Virgin Islands could receive more than
twice that amount. Why the discrepancy? One territory is included in SNAP,
the other is not. The same is true for disability assistance. An American who
receives SSI in the fifty states and the District of Columbia would receive
$783 in monthly benefits. In Puerto Rico, a family would receive $75 plus a
small housing-related benefit.
Medicaid, SNAP, and SSI are manifestations, albeit imperfect ones, of
American social citizenship. The ability to weather unemployment and sick-
ness, to live with disabilities and food insecurity, for periods of time or perma-
nently, go to the promise of full citizenship. Americans in the territories may
be U.S. citizens, but their social citizenship, as this Part shows, is lacking. As
the next Part relates, these differences in how federal law treats Americans in
the territories are begging to be challenged—in court and in Congress.
III. CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO IN COURTS AND CONGRESS
As the previous Part shows, compared to Americans who live in the
states, Americans who live in territories experience a different and, in many
ways, deficient level of social protection. These deficiencies in territorial wel-
fare administration cut across various federal programs, including the three
major programs that provide food, medical, and disability assistance to low-
income Americans. However, there are now multiple challenges to this sta-
tus quo in the federal courts and Congress. This Part begins with an analysis
of the most promising litigation strategy—that denying territorial Americans
access to federal public benefits violates the Constitution’s equal protection
guarantee. This Part then investigates various legislative fixes, some offering
temporary relief and others focused on structural changes to territorial wel-
fare administration.
A. Challenging Territorial Welfare Administration in Court
In a series of recent lawsuits, Americans living in the territories have
challenged the status quo of their second-class citizenship. They have done
so on various issues including voting rights and birthright citizenship.210
Among these challenges is a series of lawsuits brought by Americans seeking
to invalidate various provisions of the Food Stamp Act and the Social Securi-
ty Act that treat Americans who live in territories differently from Ameri-
210. See Segovia v. United States, 880 F.3d 384 (7th Cir. 2018) (challenging voting re-
strictions in Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands); Fitisemanu v. United States, 426
F. Supp. 3d 1155 (D. Utah 2019) (granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment that in-
cluded a declaratory judgment that persons born in American Samoa are citizens of the United
States under the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and accordingly that 8
U.S.C. § 1408(1) is unconstitutional), argued, No. 20-4019 (10th Cir. Sept. 23, 2020). But see
Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that the Constitution does not
require birthright citizenship for residents of American Samoa).
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cans who live in states.211 This Section provides the doctrinal context and
then tests the strength of the various constitutional arguments by the plain-
tiffs and their government.
1. Doctrinal Context: Equal Protection and the Right to Travel
The Supreme Court has held that discrimination by the federal govern-
ment violates the Fifth Amendment when it constitutes “a denial of the due
process of law.”212 The Supreme Court has identified an equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment to strike down federal legislation that
discriminates against groups in the provision of public benefits programs,
including SNAP.213 However, equal protection has generally not been a
promising avenue for Americans to attack federal welfare programs, whether
or not they live in the territories.214 Federal courts do not approach either
issue with strict scrutiny because neither poverty nor territorial residency is
considered a suspect classification.215 As a result, a federal court will sustain a
legislative classification “if the classification itself is rationally related to a le-
gitimate governmental interest.”216 The application of equal protection, the
Supreme Court has warned, is “not a license for courts to judge the wisdom,
211. See United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12, 15–16 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. granted,
141 S. Ct. 1462 (2021) (mem.); Peña Martínez v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 478 F.
Supp. 3d 155 (D.P.R. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-1946 (1st Cir. Oct. 2, 2020); Schaller v.
Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 18-1625, 2020 WL 956422, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2020), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, No. 20-1876, 2021 WL 237273 (3rd Cir. Jan. 25, 2021).
212. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
213. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 532–33 (1973). The Supreme Court
has made clear that a federal court’s “[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area
is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)
(per curiam); see also United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013) (“While the Fifth
Amendment itself withdraws from Government the power to degrade or demean in the way
this law does, the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment makes that Fifth
Amendment right all the more specific and all the better understood and preserved.”); Bolling,
347 U.S. at 500 (“[I]t would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser
duty on the Federal Government.”).
214. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); see also Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny
Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law, and Dialogic Default,
35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 637–44 (2008) (discussing Dandridge and its legacy).
215. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (“[T]his Court has held repeatedly that
poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification.” (citation omitted)); see Gerald L. Neu-
man, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
261, 263–64 (1987). For alternative views from the academy during this period, see Peter B.
Edelman, Essay, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (1987); William H. Clune III, The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Wealth
Discriminations Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 289; Frank I. Michel-
man, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Four-
teenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9 (1969); see also Cary Franklin, The New Class Blindness,
128 YALE L.J. 2, 17–46 (2018) (discussing these intellectual and doctrinal developments).
216. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533 (citation omitted).
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fairness, or logic of legislative choices.”217 Equal protection challenges that
do not rise to the level of strict scrutiny but require a quasi-heightened re-
view, sometimes referred to as “rational basis with bite,”218 have led to some
of the most significant constitutional rights cases of the last few decades, in-
cluding in the area of LGBTQ rights.219
Another potential constitutional challenge would be to allege that deny-
ing public benefits to some Americans on the basis of where they reside in
the United States violates their constitutional right to travel freely across the
country. These “right to travel” cases ran headlong into the widespread prac-
tice, rooted in the common law, of state and local governments denying en-
try to or expelling poor people.220 In Edwards v. California, the Supreme
Court struck down a California statute, colloquially known as the “Okie
law,” that made it a misdemeanor to knowingly assist a poor person in enter-
ing the state.221 Roughly thirty years later, legal aid attorneys relying on Ed-
wards and the changing jurisprudence on vagrancy began challenging
welfare rules that excluded new residents.222 In Shapiro v. Thompson, the Su-
preme Court considered three consolidated cases challenging welfare resi-
dency laws in Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and Pennsylvania. Each
case involved a statutory provision imposing a one-year wait period before
residents new to the state could receive AFDC, an earlier federal cash assis-
tance program. The Court reasoned that imposing a waiting period on wel-
fare benefits violates a poor American’s fundamental right to travel.223 Five
217. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
218. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
18–19 (1972).
219. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 672–73 (2015); United States v. Wind-
sor, 570 U.S. 744, 769–70 (2013).
220. See HIDETAKA HIROTA, EXPELLING THE POOR: ATLANTIC SEABOARD STATES & THE
19TH-CENTURY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY (2017).
221. 314 U.S. 160 (1941); see also Clare Pastore, When Paupers Became People: Edwards
v. California (1941), in THE POVERTY LAW CANON: EXPLORING THE MAJOR CASES 13, 23–28
(Marie A. Failinger & Ezra Rosser eds., 2016) (discussing the common law tradition and its
implications for Edwards).
222. See RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE, AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960S, 178–80 (2016).
223. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,
500 (1999) (“The ‘right to travel’ discussed in our cases embraces at least three different com-
ponents. It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the
right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily pre-
sent in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the
right to be treated like other citizens of that State.”); KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY:
WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 1935–1972, at 264 (2016) (“Shapiro signaled
that poor people were citizens of the nation, first and foremost, and that their rights as national
citizens could trump the longstanding prerogatives of state and local governments.”). Inci-
dentally, the Social Security Act explicitly allowed states to use durational residence require-
ments. 42 U.S.C. § 306. As California Attorney General, Earl Warren defended the statute at
issue in Edwards v. California. Pastore, supra note 221, at 23.
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years later, the Court struck down Arizona’s durational residence require-
ment for free medical care because it “penalize[d] indigents for exercising
their right to migrate to and settle in that State.”224 There, the Supreme Court
elaborated that “the right of interstate travel must be seen as insuring new
residents the same right to vital government[al] benefits and privileges in the
States to which they migrate as are enjoyed by other residents.”225
However, in Califano v. Torres, the Supreme Court declined to extend
these decisions to Puerto Rican residents.226 There, the Supreme Court
summarily reversed a three-judge District Court ruling that held the SSI
program unconstitutionally excluded Puerto Rican residents.227 In its per cu-
riam opinion, the Court admitted that “[f]or purposes of this opinion we
may assume that there is a virtually unqualified constitutional right to travel
between Puerto Rico and any of the 50 States of the Union,” but that the
doctrine has never held that a newcomer to a state should “enjoy[] those
benefits in the State from which he came.”228 Instead, the Court fell back on
its rational-basis analysis, reminding the lower federal courts that “[s]o long
as its judgments are rational, and not invidious, the legislature’s efforts to
tackle the problems of the poor and the needy are not subject to a constitu-
tional straitjacket.”229
The Court in Torres then proceeded to examine, in a single footnote, the
purported reasons for excluding Puerto Ricans from the SSI program, none
of which are particularly persuasive. First, SSI was (and still is) funded by
general revenue, and Puerto Rican “residents do not contribute to the public
treasury.”230 Second, the cost of treating Puerto Rico as a state under the
statute would be “extremely great.” And finally, providing federal benefits
“might seriously disrupt the Puerto Rican economy.”231 The Court deter-
mined these reasons were sufficient for rational basis.
Two years later, in Harris v. Rosario, Awilda Santiago Rosario and other
Puerto Ricans challenged the federal government’s lower level of reim-
bursement for Puerto Rico relative to its financing of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), a cash assistance welfare program in the fifty
states. In another per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that “so long
as there is a rational basis for its actions,” Congress could treat Puerto Rican
224. Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 261–62 (1974) (citing Shapiro, 394
U.S. at 634).
225. Id. at 261.
226. 435 U.S. 1, 4 (1978) (per curiam).
227. Torres, 435 U.S. at 4–5.
228. Id. at 4 & n.6.
229. Id. at 5.
230. Id. at 5 n.7.
231. Id.
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residents differently.232 The Supreme Court, citing the reasons offered by the
government in its brief (and the same enumerated in Torres), upheld the
statutory classification.233 Since then, successful court challenges to the ex-
clusion of territorial residents from federal public benefits have been few and
far between, until now.
2. Challenging the Exclusion of Territorial Residents from Federal Public
Benefits
The Supreme Court will revisit its decisions in Torres and Rosario, as
territorial residents are currently challenging their exclusion from federal
public benefits in the lower courts.
Last year, the First Circuit held that excluding Puerto Rican residents
from the SSI program violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment.234 As recounted at the start of this Article, José Luis Vaello-
Madero was born in Puerto Rico in 1954 and is hence a U.S. citizen by
birth.235 He moved to New York in 1985. In June 2012, Vaello-Madero began
receiving monthly SSI disability benefits, and in 2013, he moved back to
Puerto Rico. When Vaello-Madero filed for his old-age Social Security bene-
fits in Puerto Rico in June 2016, the federal agency informed him that it
would discontinue his SSI benefits. The agency’s “Notice of Planned Action”
stated that Vaello-Madero had been “outside of the U.S. for 30 days in a row
or more” since August 1, 2014, because the agency “consider[ed] the U.S. to
be the 50 States of the U.S., the District of Columbia, and the Northern Mar-
iana Islands.”236
Roughly a year later, the federal government sued Vaello-Madero to col-
lect the allegedly improper benefit payments, for a total of $28,081. An inves-
tigator employed by the agency got Vaello-Madero to sign a Stipulation of
Consent Judgment, which the federal government promptly filed in court.
The district court then appointed counsel for Vaello-Madero who filed an
answer to the complaint raising as an affirmative defense that excluding
Vaello-Madero and other Puerto Rican residents from SSI benefits violated
equal protection. The federal government then moved to withdraw the stipu-
lation and for voluntary dismissal without prejudice. The district judge ac-
cepted the withdrawal of the stipulation but denied the voluntary dismissal.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district judge ruled in favor of
Vaello-Madero. And the First Circuit affirmed, holding that excluding Puer-
232. Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651–52 (1980) (per curiam). See T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Puerto Rico and the Constitution: Conundrums and Prospects, 11 CONST.
COMMENT. 15, 22 (1994) (discussing Harris).
233. Harris, 446 U.S. at 652.
234. United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct.
1462 (2021) (mem.).
235. See Puerto Rican Federal Relations (Jones) Act, ch. 145, § 5, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (1917)
(current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1402).
236. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 15–16.
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to Rican residents from the SSI program violates the equal protection guar-
antees of the Fifth Amendment.237
Similarly, a federal district court judge, in granting a motion for sum-
mary judgment, concluded that excluding Puerto Ricans who are U.S. citi-
zens from SSI, SNAP, and Medicare Part D subsidies violates equal protection
under the Fifth Amendment.238 In Peña Martínez, nine Puerto Rican resi-
dents sued the federal government on the grounds that excluding them from
those three federal programs violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.239 The district court detailed how
“[t]he federal safety net is flimsier and more porous in Puerto Rico than in
the rest of the nation.”240
In both Vaello-Madero and Peña Martínez, the plaintiffs challenged
whether the policy rationales for excluding Puerto Rican residents from cer-
tain federal public benefits still hold.241 Both cases necessarily implicate the
two per curiam reversals by the Supreme Court forty years ago discussed
above.242 Obviously, lower courts are bound by Supreme Court precedent,
but the lower courts can examine whether the rationales cited by the Court
to uphold a legislative classification remain forty years later. Let’s look at
each of these justifications in turn.243
Rationale #1: Federal Income Tax. The federal government has argued in
both cases that the fact that Puerto Rican residents only pay federal income
tax on certain sources of income provides a rational basis from excluding
them from SSI, SNAP, and the Medicare subsidies.244 That’s true: residents
of Puerto Rico do not pay federal income tax on most types of income.245
Unlike other Social Security benefits which are paid for through payroll taxes
(taxes that Puerto Ricans pay), SSI is paid for by general tax revenue, includ-
237. Id. at 12.
238. Peña Martínez v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 478 F. Supp. 3d 155, 163–64
(D.P.R. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-1946 (1st Cir. Oct. 2, 2020).
239. Id. at 162.
240. Id.; see also Peña Martínez v. Azar, 376 F. Supp. 3d 191, 197–98 (D.P.R. 2019) (deny-
ing the federal government’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion), appeal docketed sub nom. Peña Martínez
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-1946 (1st Cir. Oct. 2, 2020).
241. See Vaello-Madero, 956 F. 3d at 27; Peña Martínez v. Azar, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 216.
242. Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980) (per curiam); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1
(1978) (per curiam).
243. In Peña Martínez, the parties disagreed whether the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Torres and Harris saw the three justifications for the policy as providing an independent versus
a combined basis for upholding the statute. See Peña Martínez v. Azar, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 210.
244. Defendants’ Combined Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment & Opposition to
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment & Inc. Memorandum of L. at 15–28, Peña Martínez
v. Azar, 376 F. Supp. 3d 191 (No. 18-cv-01206) [hereinafter Defendant’s Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment]; Opening Brief for Appellant at 13–15, Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12 (No.
19-1390).
245. See I.R.C. § 933.
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ing income tax receipts.246 Yet, while the Supreme Court in Rosario states
that Puerto Ricans “do not contribute to the federal treasury,” recent tax re-
ceipts suggest otherwise.247 Puerto Rico contributes roughly $4 billion in an-
nual tax revenue to the federal government, exceeding the contribution of
several states.248
More importantly, this is a confused justification for excluding any
group of Americans from SSI. As a means-tested program, SSI’s eligibility
rules are not based on past or future federal tax payments. SSI is a program
that only kicks in when an applicant has been shown to have insufficient
work history to qualify for Social Security Disability Insurance and has little
or no income.249 The idea that Congress could use a logic of contributory in-
surance to justify a noncontributory (i.e., means-tested) program is odd.250
The same is true for SNAP. No other group of Americans are excluded from
SNAP because they do not pay income taxes. While it is difficult to find na-
tional data on tax receipts by these recipients, it is highly unlikely that many
Americans who receive SNAP, SSI, or Medicare Part D have any federal in-
come tax liability.251 As the First Circuit noted, an individual cannot have
more than $8,796 in countable annual income to receive SSI, which is signif-
icantly less than the standard deduction of $12,400 for single tax filers, let
alone for the blind and elderly.252 Perhaps that is why there is no other case
where the federal government has defended its exclusion of a group of peo-
ple from a welfare program on the basis of federal tax contributions.253
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 1381; see also Department of Defense and Labor, Health, and Human
Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019,
Pub. L. No. 115-245, 132 Stat. 2981, 3114–15 (2018).
247. Rosario, 446 U.S. at 652.
248. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 24 (pointing out that Puerto Rico contributes more to fed-
eral taxes “than taxpayers in several of the states . . . including Vermont, Wyoming, South Da-
kota, North Dakota, Montana, and Alaska” (citing SOI Tax Stats – Gross Collections, by Type of
Tax and State – IRS Data Book Table 5, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov
/statistics/soi-tax-stats-gross-collections-by-type-of-tax-and-state-irs-data-book-table-5
[https://perma.cc/5AQA-GHSQ])).
249. See Understanding Supplemental Security Income SSI Eligibility Requirements—2020
Edition, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-eligibility-ussi.htm [https://perma.cc
/JUV9-XCRM]; Disability Benefits: How You Qualify, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov
/benefits/disability/qualify.html [https://perma.cc/C8LP-XENS].
250. The best evidence that the federal government could cite for this argument is that
some lawfully present immigrants are excluded from SSI. One could argue that this is based on
a contributory principle. See Hammond, supra note 140, at 517.
251. A stronger contribution-based argument for the federal government would be that
SSI recipients may have paid income taxes in the past or will do so in the future. But again, that
type of argument misconceives why individuals are eligible for means-tested disability assis-
tance in the first place.
252. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 27 & n.23.
253. Cf. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 63 (1982) (“Appellants’ reasoning
would . . . permit the State to apportion all benefits and services according to the past tax [or
intangible] contributions of its citizens. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits such an appor-
tionment of state services.” (emphasis added by court) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
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Rationale #2: The Cost of Treating a Territory Like a State. The federal
government rightly points out that judicial review of “distinctions that Con-
gress draws in order to make allocations from a finite pool of resources must
be deferential,” and that “protecting the fiscal integrity of Government pro-
grams, and of the Government as a whole, is a legitimate concern of the
State.”254 That said, a federal court must be able to identify a valid reason for
the cost savings.255 And in its briefing in both Vaello-Madero and Peña-
Martínez, the government did not identify a reason why Congress would
treat some Americans who live in territories differently from other Ameri-
cans who are eligible for the federal benefits on the basis of their poverty,
disability, or age. This is an awkward rationale for programs with nationally
defined benefit amounts, as it costs the same amount of money to award SSI
benefits to an eligible citizen in Puerto Rico as it does to award those benefits
to someone in Florida, Vermont, or the Northern Mariana Islands
(CNMI).256 Singling out otherwise-eligible Americans because they reside in
territories is the kind of arbitrary decision equal protection is supposed to
protect Americans against.
Rationale #3: Economic Disruption. In 1978 and 1980, the Court in
Torres and Rosario noted the federal government’s concerns about the eco-
nomic disruption that would come from extending federal public benefits to
Puerto Rican residents.257 The federal government has cited in its briefing
that “published studies have concluded that SSI and SNAP payments are as-
sociated with important work-disincentivizing effects.”258 The federal gov-
ernment has also represented that “Congress could . . . rationally conclude
that these effects [could] be more severe in Puerto Rico” because of the island’s
weaker economic situation compared to the rest of the United States.259
It is beyond dispute that the federal government’s economic policy to-
wards Puerto Rico is markedly different today. At the time Torres and Ro-
sario were decided, Congress had legislated significant tax incentives for
618, 632–33 (1969))); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 507 (1999) (reasoning that equal protection
prohibits the government from apportioning benefits and services “according to the past tax
contributions of its citizens” because it “would logically permit the State to bar new residents
from schools, parks, and libraries or deprive them of police and fire protection” (quoting
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632–33 (1969))).
254. Lyng v. UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 373 (1988) (cleaned up); see also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483
U.S. 587, 599 (1987) (concluding that statute served Congress’s goal of decreasing federal ex-
penditures by “identify[ing] a group that would suffer less than others as a result of a reduction
in benefits”).
255. See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980); Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa
Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 263 (1974) (“[A] State may not protect the public fisc by drawing an invid-
ious distinction between classes of its citizens, so appellees must do more than show that deny-
ing free medical care to new residents saves money.” (citation omitted)).
256. See supra Section II.C.
257. Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 5 n.7 (1978) (per curiam); Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S.
651, 652 (1980) (per curiam).
258. Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 244, at 32.
259. Id.
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corporations doing business in Puerto Rico.260 Congress repealed those tax
exemptions in 1996.261 Furthermore, Congress recently created an oversight
board to oversee Puerto Rico’s budget in light of the economic fallout from
Hurricane Maria and the island’s bankruptcy.262 But it is not clear which way
these changes cut.263 Should courts interpret this legislative activity as evi-
dence that the Torres/Rosario rationales are outdated and therefore the equal
protection challenges can proceed? Or should courts look at this new con-
gressional activity as evidence that Congress is actively legislating in this area
and the courts should get out of the way?
Beyond the Torres/Rosario rationales, it is also difficult to justify the pol-
icy in light of the fact that some territories are included in the statutory
schemes for SSI, SNAP, and Medicare Part D but Puerto Rico and other ter-
ritories are not.264 As laid out in Part II, Northern Mariana Islanders are eli-
gible for the SSI program, despite having similar tax liability to Puerto
Ricans. Guamanians and Virgin Islanders can receive SNAP even though
Americans who reside in other territories cannot. But the federal govern-
ment argued on appeal in Vaello-Madero that there is no doctrine for territo-
ries comparable to, say, the equal footing doctrine for tribes.265 This is an
inapt analogy. The federal government misapprehends the unit of analysis—
it is not the territory, but the American citizen who resides there. Our consti-
tutional order does have an equal footing doctrine—for citizens. Indeed, the
question in Vaello-Madero is the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
promise of full, national citizenship and its application to Americans who
live in the U.S. territories.
Besides, this is not a question of a gradation of different services. Ameri-
cans who live in American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands are denied access to the nation’s disability assistance program—full
stop. And Americans in all the territories confront a federal law that caps
aid; if too many of them seek healthcare through Medicaid, they are out of
luck. If the oldest democracy and wealthiest country on the planet lacks a
260. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1051(b), 90 Stat. 1520, 1643
(codified at I.R.C. § 936).
261. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1601(a), 110
Stat. 1755, 1827.
262. See Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48
U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241; Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1942 (2016)
(“Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities are in the midst of a fiscal crisis.”).
263. Compare Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1876 (2016) (recognizing
Congress’s role in allowing Puerto Rico to alter its governmental structure), with Franklin Cal.
Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. at 1944–46 (explaining that the constitutional status of Puerto Rico
provided the rational basis for treating the Commonwealth differently than the states for pur-
poses of Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code).
264. See supra Table 1.
265. United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12, 31 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141 S.
Ct. 1462 (2021) (mem.); see also Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(holding that the Constitution does not require birthright citizenship for residents of American
Samoa).
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constitutional commitment to protect its citizens from the most elemental of
deprivations, what exactly does our equal protection jurisprudence protect?
Looking forward, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions, including unan-
imously upholding Puerto Rico’s oversight board, suggests that the Court
will be less solicitous of equal protection challenges.266 And some programs
may be more vulnerable to constitutional attack than others. Programs like
SSI and SNAP that have benefit levels for the entire nation except certain ter-
ritories seem particularly vulnerable, but Medicaid may be less amenable to
litigation by Americans in the territories. Medicaid involves a mix of federal
and state funding, and the Supreme Court undid the Affordable Care Act’s
attempt to create a national standard of eligibility. The unfavorable signals
from the Supreme Court and the difference in programs’ susceptibility to
court challenges suggest that Congress may be a more receptive forum to
changing the status quo of placing territorial Americans outside the welfare
state. Despite being a national legislature that denies meaningful participa-
tion to some Americans, including those who are the focus of this Article,
Congress could eliminate the territorial exceptionalism in the American wel-
fare state. The next Section explains how it could do so.
B. Legislation: Placing Territories on Par with States
The traditional judicial deference afforded to Congress means that it
would most likely have a free hand to end territorial exceptionalism in the
American welfare state. Moreover, even if the federal courts entertain consti-
tutional challenges to how federal law treats Americans in U.S. territories, it
will ultimately fall to Congress to amend the statutes governing Medicaid,
Medicare, SNAP, and SSI.267 Fortunately, recent activity in Congress to shore
up funding for food, medical, and disability assistance in the territories sug-
gests that structural reform could be on the horizon. This Section discusses
the various instances where, in the wake of financial and climate disasters,
Congress has approved additional funding for welfare programs in the terri-
tories. It concludes by looking at various legislative proposals that could be
combined for structural changes to these programs in the territories.
1. Emergency Relief: Economic Downturns, the Climate Crisis, and
COVID-19
In the last decade or so, Congress has repeatedly provided supplemental
funds to the American territories to help shore up the public benefits pro-
grams. Often Congress has acted in response to a rolling series of crises: the
266. See Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. v. Aurelius Inv., 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020).
267. Other commentators have made a similar judgment call about Congress being the
most promising forum for changing the status quo. See, e.g., César A. López Morales, Note, A
Political Solution to Puerto Rico’s Disenfranchisement: Reconsidering Congress’s Role in Bringing
Equality to America’s Long-Forgotten Citizens, 32 B.U. INT’L L.J. 185, 191, 209 n.128, 216 (2014).
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2008 financial crisis, several hurricanes that have struck the islands, and,
most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic.
The 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession that followed led to
dramatic increases in the number of Americans losing their jobs, their health
insurance, and their homes.268 In response, President Obama and the 111th
Congress enacted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(ARRA), which increased spending and expanded access to several public
benefits programs, including but not limited to Medicaid, SNAP, and SSI.269
Specifically for territories, ARRA made significant increases to SNAP, which
included Guam and the U.S. Virgins Islands, as well as temporarily increased
food assistance for Puerto Rico and American Samoa.270 SSI recipients, in-
cluding those in the CNMI, received a one-time $250 payment.271 And Con-
gress increased the cap on Medicaid reimbursement to all five territories by
30 percent.272
Congress has also had to confront several extreme weather events across
the United States. As discussed in Part I, the five U.S. territories are particu-
larly vulnerable to these calamities, which have been (and will continue to
be) made more frequent and more intense because of the climate crisis.273
Congress appropriated additional nutrition assistance funding for Puerto Ri-
268. See SHEILA ZEDLEWSKI, URB. INST., FACT SHEET: SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION
ASSISTANCE COUNTERS HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT (2011); Marianne Bitler, Hilary Hoynes & Elira
Kuka, Child Poverty, the Great Recession, and the Social Safety Net in the United States, 36 J.
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 358 (2017); Marianne Bitler & Hilary Hoynes, The More Things
Change, the More They Stay the Same? The Safety Net and Poverty in the Great Recession, 34 J.
LAB. ECON. S403, S404 (2016).
269. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) increased SNAP benefit
levels, increased eligibility, and reduced administrative costs with an additional 40 billion dol-
lars appropriation. BRYNNE KEITH-JENNINGS & DOTTIE ROSENBAUM, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES, SNAP BENEFIT BOOST IN 2009 RECOVERY ACT PROVIDED ECONOMIC
STIMULUS AND REDUCED HARDSHIP (2015), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms
/files/3-31-15fa.pdf [https://perma.cc/724S-AMHY]. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
was expanded for larger families, and the marriage penalty was reduced. See Tax Policy Center
Briefing Book: Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System; What is the Earned Income Tax Credit?,
TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-earned-income-tax-
credit [https://perma.cc/2GGL-3XKC]. Through ARRA, Congress provided a one-time pay-
ment of $250 to roughly fifty-five million Social Security and SSI recipients. American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act 2009, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/recovery
[https://perma.cc/6KB4-EBNF] (“Implementation” tab).
270. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 101, 123
Stat. 115, 120 (increasing “the value of benefits determined under section 8(a) of the Food and
Nutrition Act of 2008 and consolidated block grants for Puerto Rico and American Samoa de-
termined under section 19(a) of such Act”).
271. Id. § 2201.
272. Id. § 5001(d).
273. It is telling that American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands
have joined a coalition of small island and low-lying coastal developing states around the world
to work collectively on the issue of climate change. See About Us, ALL. SMALL ISLAND STATES,
https://www.aosis.org/about [https://perma.cc/DZ4B-7H4V].
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co following the devastating hurricanes of 2017.274 Congress also made spe-
cial appropriations for American Samoa following Cyclone Gita, which
struck the island in 2018.275 But additional food assistance funding for Puer-
to Rico stalled last year. In January 2019, the House of Representatives ap-
proved additional disaster funding for Puerto Rico, which included an
additional $600 million in Nutrition Assistance Program (NAP) funds. The
Trump Administration referred to the $600 million needed for food assis-
tance as “excessive and unnecessary.”276 Due to the increased need following
Hurricane Maria and the lack of additional funds from the federal govern-
ment, Puerto Rico cut NAP spending by $100 million per month.277
Finally, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress has increased
spending on SNAP and Medicaid across the country, including the territo-
ries. An exhaustive treatment of these legislative changes for these programs
and others can be found elsewhere,278 but it is worth detailing some of these
changes as an illustration of the current Congress’s capacity and propensity
to change the status quo of territorial exceptionalism. With the Families First
Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA), Congress provided time-limited sup-
plemental federal Medicaid funds to the five territories.279 Congress further
274. Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements of 2017,
Pub. L. 115-72, § 309, 131 Stat. 1224, 1229. As for administrative action, the U.S. Department
of Agriculture enabled Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands to implement several measures
to ease access to food for those Puerto Ricans who are most in need after Hurricane Maria. E.g.,
Letter from Patricia N. Dombroski, Adm’r, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Mid-Atl. Region, to Hon. Glo-
rimar Andújar-Matos, Sec’y, P.R. Dep’t of the Fam. (Sept. 30, 2017), http://redbluedivide.com
/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/360622388-USDA-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3EB-35LK];
FNS Disaster Assistance: U.S. Virgin Islands, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV.
(Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.fns.usda.gov/disaster/us-virgin-islands [https://perma.cc/SYS4-
5F5L]. The USDA commonly grants this flexibility after natural disasters and recently approved
similar requests from states like Florida and Texas. FNS Disaster Assistance: Florida Disaster
Nutrition Assistance, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV. (Sept. 16, 2020), https://
www.fns.usda.gov/disaster/florida-disaster-nutrition-assistance [https://perma.cc/F5RG-LJHA];
FNS Disaster Assistance: Texas Disaster Nutrition Assistance, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD &
NUTRITION SERV. (Aug. 22, 2020), https://www.fns.usda.gov/disaster/texas-disaster-nutrition-
assistance [https://perma.cc/36HN-UXTL].
275. See Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act, Pub. L. No.
116-20, 133 Stat. 871, 875 (2019).
276. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY: H.R. 268—SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2019 (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/saphr268h_20190116.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M4R5-4LLQ].
277. Keith-Jennings, supra note 10.
278. See generally Andrew Hammond, Ariel Jurow Kleiman & Gabriel Scheffler, How the
COVID-19 Pandemic Has and Should Reshape the American Safety Net, 105 MINN. L. REV.
HEADNOTES 154 (2020) (analyzing stimulus efforts).
279. See Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178
(2020). These actions raised American Samoa’s FY 2020 allotment from $12.4 million to $86.3
million and its FY 2021 allotment from approximately $12.7 million to $85.6 million. See
ALISON MITCHELL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11012, MEDICAID FINANCING FOR THE TERRITORIES
1 (2020). The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020 raised American Samoa’s FYs
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increased the federal funding for all states and territories by 6.2 percent until
the coronavirus emergency ends.280 In addition, the FFCRA provided in-
creased funding for nutrition assistance for American Samoa, the CNMI,
and Puerto Rico.281 The Act also enhanced SNAP allotments for Guam and
the U.S. Virgin Islands.282 Notably, Congress decided to treat territories in
the same manner as states by including all the territories in the new Pandem-
ic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) program.283 Various bills introduced in
the last Congress proposed further assistance to the territories.284 The Amer-
ican Rescue Plan, the new Congress’s latest COVID stimulus legislation,
provided further assistance to the territories. Among other things, Congress
extended the child tax credit to families in the territories,285 provided addi-
tional funding for emergency rental assistance,286 and extended additional
food assistance funding in the territories.287
This legislative activity suggests that there is an appetite in both houses
of Congress for additional support for food, health, and disability assistance
for Americans living in the U.S. territories. With the notable exception of the
Affordable Care Act, these appropriations seem to be in response to some
national or regional emergency. And all of these legislative initiatives were
part of omnibus legislation that included significant support to Americans in
2020 and 2021 allotments to $84 million. Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub.
L. No. 116-94, 133 Stat. 2534. Subsequently, FFCRA further raised the FY 2020 allotment to
$86.3 million and the FY 2021 allotment to $85.5 million.
280. Families First Coronavirus Response Act § 6008. In order to receive the funds, states
and territories may not: (1) reduce eligibility standards, (2) increase premiums, (3) terminate
enrollment, (4) conduct more frequent income checks, or (5) fail to cover coronavirus tests,
treatments, vaccines, and therapies without beneficiary cost sharing.
281. Families First Coronavirus Response Act § 1102; Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Eco-
nomic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281, 508 (2020).
282. See Lannie Walker, SNAP Beneficiaries to Get Maximum Allotment, GUAM DAILY
POST (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.postguam.com/news/local/snap-beneficiaries-to-get-
maximum-allotment/article_b52ee186-7953-11ea-a84f-e3faecce3d21.html [https://perma.cc
/5RGJ-UTGN]; Current SNAP Recipients to Receive Additional Benefits April and May; No
DSNAP Available as Yet, VIRGIN ISLANDS CONSORTIUM (Apr. 9, 2020, 5:33 PM),
https://viconsortium.com/vi-coronavirus/virgin-islands-current-snap-recipients-to-receive-
additional-benefits-april-and-may-no-dsnap-available-as-yet- [https://perma.cc/TY7U-Z934].
283. Letter from John Pallasch, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, to State Workforce
Agencies, Unemployment Insurance Program (Apr. 5, 2020), https://wdr.doleta.gov
/directives/attach/UIPL/UIPL_16-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/92QQ-YDGK] (relaying that the
PUA “program is available in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, [and] the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands”).
284. See, e.g., Coronavirus Medicaid Response Act, H.R. 6539, 116th Cong. (2020); Insu-
lar Area Medicaid Coronavirus Recovery Act, H.R. 6658, 116th Cong. (2020); Medicare Crisis
Program Act of 2020, H.R. 6674, 116th Cong. (2020); COVID-19 Recovery for Seniors and
People with Disabilities Act of 2020, H.R. 6951, 116th Cong. (2020).
285. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 9611, 135 Stat. 4, 144.
286. Id. § 3201.
287. Id. § 1103(b) (nutrition assistance); Id. § 1108 (Pandemic EBT).
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the fifty states and made other changes to federal law far removed from the
social welfare context.
2. A Structural Proposal: Ending Territorial Exceptionalism in Public
Benefits
The need for the emergency appropriations and revisions discussed
above would be greatly reduced by legislative fixes to the structure and fi-
nancing of territorial welfare programs. This more ambitious legislation
could simply incorporate the five U.S. territories into the existing statutory
framework for SNAP, Medicaid, Medicare Part D, and SSI.
Specifically, Congress should make three major changes to the federal
social welfare statutes. First, Congress should amend the Food Stamp Act to
include American Samoa, the CNMI, and Puerto Rico.288 Second, Congress
should also amend Titles XVIII and XIX of the Social Security Act to bring
Americans who live in the five U.S. territories into the default eligibility
framework for Medicaid and Medicare Part D subsidies.289 Finally, Congress
should make all Americans, regardless of where they live in the United
States, eligible for SSI, our national means-tested disability assistance. That
could be done by simply revising the definition of the “United States” in the
Social Security Act to include the remaining territories.
Moreover, each of these legislative fixes could be included in larger piec-
es of legislation in the coming years. For instance, Congress could revise the
SNAP program to include the three excluded territories in the next Farm
Bill. Similarly, the Medicaid and Medicare fixes could be incorporated as
part of a broader reform bill, just as Congress incorporated additional funds
for the territories’ medical assistance in the Affordable Care Act. Of the pro-
grams discussed, SSI has been the quietest site of legislative activity, but even
there Congress increased SSI benefits as part of its 2009 stimulus package.290
Instead of reacting to a series of rolling crises, Congress could end territorial
exceptionalism in Medicaid, SNAP, and SSI, and thereby guarantee food,
medical, and disability assistance to Americans in need, regardless of where
they live in the United States.
IV. BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE AS A RACIAL ORDER
So far, this Article has sought to focus attention on how federal law dis-
advantages Americans who happen to live in the U.S. territories by denying
them access to the standard set of federal public benefit programs like Medi-
288. Legislation introduced by Sen. Bernie Sanders and Rep. Nydia Velázquez in 2019
would serve as a useful model. See Equitable Nutrition Assistance for the Territories Act of
2019, S. 677, 116th Cong. (2019).
289. See, e.g., H.R. 1354, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 4666, 116th Cong. (2019).
290. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 2201, 123
Stat. 115, 450–454 (codified at I.R.C. § 6428 note) (authorizing a one-time $250 Economic Re-
covery Payment to certain SSI beneficiaries, among others).
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caid, SNAP, and SSI. This exclusion of the people of American Samoa,
Guam, the CNMI, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands is vulnerable to
equal protection challenges in federal court and worthy of legislative fixes in
Congress. In this area of federal law and others, these Americans are outsid-
ers. But what if their outsider status is not an outlier? What if their experi-
ence is, in another sense, the quintessence of social protection in the United
States? Put another way, perhaps the experience of Americans in the territo-
ries is yet one more example in which the American welfare state is predicat-
ed on a racial order? This Part runs that suspicion down.
Some might argue that the equal protection doctrine cannot be used to
place Americans who live in territories on par with states because it lacks a
limiting principle for how federal law accommodates differences in state
treatment. It could upend our understanding of social citizenship in the
United States. But that’s precisely the point. A conventional view would sug-
gest that a woman in Mississippi has more in common, as a constitutional
matter, with a woman in Massachusetts than with a woman in Guam. But
when we look at social citizenship—that is, the legal protections afforded
those Americans—our constitutional order seems to be one that is racialized,
excluding Black, Latinx, and indigenous Americans, not to mention those
who happen to live in the territories.
Conceptualizing the public law that governs the American welfare state
as a racial order is a matter of course for some scholars.291 As discussed in
Part I, the politics and policies of the New Deal and the Great Society, as well
as the retrenchment efforts of Presidents Reagan and Clinton, betray a racial
order. In his recasting of social citizenship as an American political tradition,
William Forbath has described how “[n]ot only were most black Americans
excluded from the benefits of the main New Deal programs, but this consti-
tutional bad faith at black America’s expense also deprived all Americans of
the institutional foundations and political-constitutional legacy of social citi-
zenship.”292 Similarly, Dorothy Roberts argued in the midst of the debate
over welfare reform in the 1990s that “Black citizenship is at once America’s
chief reason for and impediment to a strong welfare state” because “white
Americans have resisted the expansion of welfare precisely because of its
benefits to Blacks.”293
Even the continuing controversies over the Affordable Care Act, the
landmark legislation of the nation’s first Black president, continue to play
out over a racialized political terrain. The law-trained among us may bristle
at the notion that a woman in Mississippi has more in common with a wom-
an in Guam than she does with a woman in Massachusetts. But when it
291. See, e.g., MUSTAFA EMIRBAYER & MATTHEW DESMOND, THE RACIAL ORDER 285–
332 (2015); DEBORAH E. WARD, THE WHITE WELFARE STATE: THE RACIALIZATION OF U.S.
WELFARE POLICY, 120–21 (2005) (citing 1942 Social Security Bureau report documenting few-
er Black and American Indian children receiving cash assistance).
292. Forbath, supra note 47, at 209.
293. Roberts, supra note 53, at 1566.
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comes to their access to healthcare, states that have refused to participate in
the Affordable Care Act start to look more like territories. Indeed, in her re-
cent book on Medicaid, political scientist Jamila Michener notes that among
the states that refused to implement the Medicaid expansion were eight of
the top eleven states with the largest share of the nation’s Black popula-
tion.294 And all of those eight southern states once belonged to the former
Confederacy. In short, once we recognize the differences in social protection
between states and territories, we begin to see more clearly the differences
that persist among states.295 And the experience of the territories suggests
that differences across and within the United States rely on a racial hierar-
chy—one that cannot stand. Just as legal historians have connected the past
of Reconstruction politics and doctrine to the American acquisition of U.S.
territories,296 so too could lawyers and advocates in the present draw on a
renewed attack on discrimination of territorial residents as part of a broader
agenda for a Third Reconstruction.297
Public law scholars have looked for a paradigm or framework to pro-
mote in service of a legal agenda that makes good on the promises of the
more egalitarian aspects of the American legal tradition with a particular fo-
294. JAMILA MICHENER, FRAGMENTED DEMOCRACY: MEDICAID, FEDERALISM, AND
UNEQUAL POLITICS 54–55 (2018).
295. TANI, supra note 223, at 279 (discussing how American social welfare law “em-
brace[s] centralization . . . recogniz[ing] both the states and the federal government as valid
centers and hence valid administrators—allowing, in effect, for unequal, nonuniform citizen
experiences with authority”).
296. See supra notes 109–114 and accompanying text.
297. See Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, The Third Reconstruction: An Alternative to Race
Consciousness and Colorblindness in Post-slavery America, 54 ALA. L. REV. 483, 483 (2003);
Tracey Meares, A Third Reconstruction?, BALKINIZATION (Aug. 14, 2015), https://balkin
.blogspot.com/2015/08/a-third-reconstruction.html [https://perma.cc/BN4M-VFK5] (discuss-
ing the framework as foregrounding “the nature of racial inequality and hierarchy in the con-
temporary United States and what steps we might take to address this”); see also Paul Butler,
The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104
GEO. L.J. 1419, 1475 (2016) (“I . . . support a frame alignment around the term ‘Third Recon-
struction,’ which some activists and scholars have used to refer to a coordinated effort to ad-
dress institutional racism and inequality. The term is evolving to describe not only changes in
public policy and legal doctrines, but also a broad-based social movement focused on racial
justice.”). Scholars in constitutional law have also used the term. See, e.g., Richard Primus, Sec-
ond Redemption, Third Reconstruction, 106 CALIF. L. REV 1987, 1999 (2018) (expressing “the
hope for a healthy American constitutional order” that will work toward creating “nothing less
than a Third Reconstruction”); Bruce Ackerman, De-Schooling Constitutional Law, 123 YALE
L.J. 3104, 3131–32 (2014). And Reverend Barber, whose Poor People’s Campaign represents a
sustained social movement on many of these issues, has repeatedly used this framework. See
WILLIAM J. BARBER II WITH JONATHAN WILSON-HARTGROVE, THE THIRD RECONSTRUCTION:
HOW A MORAL MOVEMENT IS OVERCOMING THE POLITICS OF DIVISION AND FEAR (2016);
William J. Barber II, We Are Witnessing the Birth Pangs of a Third Reconstruction: We Need a
Moral Movement to Create Change, THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 15, 2016, 12:57 PM), https://archive
.thinkprogress.org/rev-barber-moral-change-1ad2776df7c [https://perma.cc/QB7M-R3WY]
(describing the post–Civil War period as the first, the civil rights era that followed Jim Crow as
the second, and the backlash to the Obama Presidency as the beginnings of the third).
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cus on racial justice. Some have begun to create a vocabulary that captures
the sense of constitutional decline or rot.298 As discussed at the start, if this
Article puts down any marker in those debates, it is to insist that, however
those debates resolve, that agenda cannot ignore the exclusion of Americans
who live in U.S. territories from basic services. A broad-based justice move-
ment could and should shake the foundation of the racialized welfare state,
including its exclusion of Americans in the territories.
In the end, there are reasons to think that state-based social citizenship
may be especially ill-suited to today’s America. First, the hyperpolarization
of politics has led to most states being dominated by one-party rule.299 Sec-
ond, the defining global forces of rapid technological change, dramatic con-
centrations of wealth, and the climate crisis demand responses on an order
of magnitude that even California cannot meet. These forces do not respect
national boundaries, much less those of a given state. That’s why it seems
unlikely that the status of the American territories will be static in the com-
ing years. Political and social forces in the territories, as well as the existential
threat of the climate crisis, are putting increasing pressure on this creaky
corner of the American welfare state. To be sure, the movement of territorial
peoples has occurred for generations, but the societal pressures that attend a
changing climate are unprecedented.300
What happens when massive internal displacement, including but not
limited to territorial peoples, collides with a patchwork of legal infrastructure
premised on cooperative federalism? Perhaps state governments will treat
new arrivals from neighboring states with generosity. Perhaps states will be
able to meet the surge in demand for basic services like food and medical
care from their own coffers. Perhaps the federal government will shoulder
much of the resulting cost. But past episodes of internal displacement in the
United States—including the experiences of Black Americans in the Great
Migration, the Okies and Arkies of the Dust Bowl, and migrant farmwork-
ers—is more often chilling than not. And of course, territorial residents have
consistently experienced discrimination when migrating to states.301 The
country’s anti-immigrant politics also bodes ill. It would be naive to think
298. See Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA
L. REV. 78 (2018); Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot, 77 MD. L. REV.
147, 150–51 (2017) (describing conditions of decay in the American constitutional system and
defining “constitutional rot” as “a process of decay in the features of our system of government
that maintain it as a healthy democratic republic”); Richard Primus, The Republic in Long-
Term Perspective, 117 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2018).
299. Timothy Williams, With Most States Under One Party’s Control, America Grows
More Divided, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/us/state-
legislatures-partisan-polarized.html [https://perma.cc/QN29-AKFB].
300. See IMMERWAHR, supra note 128, at 251 (pointing out that in 1950, one in seven
Puerto Ricans lived on the mainland; five years later, almost one in four did); see also id. at 257
(detailing how Congress immediately struck a bill of economic rights from Puerto Rico’s pro-
posed constitution).
301. See Anna M. Santiago & George Galster, Puerto Rican Segregation in the United
States: Cause or Consequence of Economic Status?, 42 SOC. PROBS. 361, 379 (1995).
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states will welcome all new arrivals, even if they are their fellow citizens. The
new normal of climate migration could be devastating for Americans who
have heretofore been placed outside the American welfare state.
CONCLUSION
Federal law has excluded millions of Americans from crucial public ben-
efits simply because they live in the United States territories. This Article de-
tails and problematizes that status quo and suggests how the courts, and
more likely, Congress, could end this territorial exceptionalism in the Amer-
ican welfare state. The changes to federal law proposed in this Article are
necessary to meet the threat of significant internal migration, but they are
not sufficient. The United States is entering a perilous phase where the cli-
mate crisis will make it increasingly difficult for millions of Americans to
meet basic needs, including those who live in American Samoa, the CNMI,
Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The existing legal infra-
structure of the American welfare state will not withstand the climate crisis
without a commitment to social citizenship that rests on a foundation other
than a racial order.
